The Union Nation peace keeping mission was established in Sudan by the United Nation Security Council under the 1590 Resolution of 24th of March 2005, after the peace agreement has been signed between the People Liberation Movement and the government of Sudan on January 9, 2005 in Nairobi, Kenya. UNMIS tasks are to support the
implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, to perform certain functions relating to humanitarian assistance, protection, promotion of human rights, and to support African Union Mission in Sudan. The mandate of UNMIS ended on 9 July 2011; the UNSC officially ended the mission on 11 July 2011, with a drawdown by 31 August 2011. Equipment and personnel will be transferred to UNISFA and UNMISS.
Peacekeeping involves the deployment of law enforcement agencies namely the police and the armed forces of nations and civilians personnel to assist in the implementation of agreement reached between government and parties who engaged in conflict. Peace keeping can also mean military policing action undertaking by the military personnel and the police, under the authority of a political body, an organization, group of state or in rare cases, a single nation to support the implementation of an agreed peace. It is a peaceful third party intervention which operates with a set of guiding principles that includes the consent of the parties in conflict, impartiality and the non-use or the minimum use of force except in self-defense.
Recurrence and re-escalation of conflicts in various parts of the world, most especially in the developing states, has indeed made the word ‘sustainable peace’ an illusion. A lot can be said on the havoc wrecked by these conflicts on the people and the devastating effects on the natural environment. Regrettably, all efforts made to put an end to wars, conflict and crises around the globe yield little or no significant results since conflict recur and the proclivity of conflict remained undefeatable (Adegbite et al, 2005:2).
The conflict in Sudan is one of the most problematic and the longest running civil war in the world today. Since 1983, Sudan has been stained by the blood of 2.5 million dead and 7 million displaced persons (Times magazine, 2009:8). Historically, the conflict evolved from a rebellion marked by post-colonial characteristic to a new kind of war in which the control of natural resources plays a significant role. In fact, the sources of conflict in Sudan cannot be reduced simply into one dominating factor be it religious, political or economic, cultural or historic. Therefore, the conflict has to be viewed as resulting from interaction between various sources originating from tradition of the Arab domination of the south dated back to the first contact between the Turkish which ruled North and Southern black African peoples in the early decades of the 80s (Aleksi 2004;2).
According to a report, written by Mehari Taddele Maru, an Al Jazeera Reporter, on 27 December, 2013. The Pan-African community, together with relevant international actors, a referendum held in line with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) peacefully delivered the newest nation on July 9, 2011. Globally welcomed as the world's newest state, the hopes and wishes of the international community for South Sudan were far from what we are now witnessing. The current crisis in South Sudan amounts to a failure of the international community to ensure that this new state develops into a democratic and stable nation .On the 15th of December, an armed confrontation erupted at the centre of the South Sudanese governmental authority, the presidential palace in Juba - a confrontation between army officers loyal to President Salva Kiir and disgruntled soldiers backing his ex-deputy Riek Machar - that has now begun to deteriorate into a civil war.
While the African Union (AU) and IGAD characterized the situation as a 'crisis', Kiir claims that it constituted an attempted coup. The president then arrested several former ministers and officials of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) - who were dismissed in July - in his cabinet, including Taban Deng, Oyayi Deng, John Luk Jok, Majak D'Agoot, Gier Chuang, Deng Alor, Pagan Amum, Peter Adwok, Alfred Lado, Cirino Hiting Kosti Manibe and Chol Tong. From an undisclosed area, the fugitive former Vice President Machar announced that no one had attempted a coup, and accused Kiir of employing state power for the illegal purpose of silencing dissent within the ruling party, the SPLM. Easily exploitable ethnic markers, particularly in the form of the Dinka and Nuer, are being employed for political gains and dominance within the party. With thousands reportedly killed, and tens of thousands displaced along ethnic lines, South Sudan is on the brink of civil war. In this situation, spoilers from and beyond the region may exploit the situation to their advantage. Unless managed responsibly by all factions within the SPLM and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement Army (SPLA), and with a concerted effort by the international and Pan-African community, this crisis could lead to a civil war.
Even more and for the purpose of certainty, this tension has been brewing for some time. Since the middle of 2012, schisms within the SPLM have become public. In July, in what the public considered as autocratic and in some aspects unconstitutional move, Kiir dismissed the entire cabinet and some state governors elected by the public. Machar, the former vice president was one of those dismissed. On December 14, a meeting of the National Liberation Council - the top leadership of the SPLM accelerated the final rapture within SPLM. Nonetheless, the root cause of the crisis lays in a lack of willingness to democratise and low levels of delivery of basic services to the public.
UNHINGED
ALLIANCE
Borne
out of a post-independence political indulgence and inclination marked by the
absence of any credible and meaningful reform, it was not surprising that the
crisis in the SPLM erupted at the top echelon of political power. During the
armed struggle for independence, the glue that kept the various divergent
forces of the SPLM intact was their common enemy in Khartoum and their
aspiration for self-determination and independence. Now, that glue is not strong
enough to hold all divergent views together, and the SPLM is no longer a
liberation movement. It is a ruling party, and as such should behave
democratically to allow the South Sudanese people to exercise all the rights
for which they fought. The SPLM has to discharge its responsibilities on behalf
of all the functions of the state. Once independence is achieved, unless
transformed into a democratic political force, it becomes only a matter of time
before liberation movements face internal divisions and even total rejection by
their various supporters. Post-independence Africa, including the recent
example of Eritrea, attests to this development.
It was a matter of time before the SPLM leadership had to face the
mounting grievances of the population. After independence, Juba became the
center of South Sudan with its own peripheral areas inhabited by diverse
communities demanding constitutional accommodation in one state. In
post-liberation period, being a majority in number should not be construed as a
majority in power with a license to do whatever one wishes. Juba, under the
current leadership of SPLM, failed to take this into account. Disregarding the
increasing discontent by the minority within SPLM, the leadership style of the
top leaders of the SPLM focused on winning routine political scuffles and
abandoned the task of nation building. Political instability has been accelerated by rampant corruption
that is symptomatic of the country's weak legislative, regulatory and
enforcement mechanisms. Without military, legislative and other state
institutions being resistant to abuses and misuse by the political wing of the
relevant liberation movement, autocratic elements of the liberation movement
may take over.
WIDER IMPLICATIONS The
current crisis has grave consequences and implications for South Sudan and the
Horn of Africa. SPLM is left with two options: democratization - like that
of South Africa after apartheid, despite facing similar challenges of a
liberation movement, ANC remains a democratic party; or authoritarianism - like
Eritrea which after independence became more authoritarian to the point of
being considered as an example of a pariah state under Isaias Afeworki's two
decades of rule. The latter would prove more difficult given that Kiir will
find the struggle to monopolies state power much more difficult compared to
Afeworki who has exercised for the past two
decades. Previous efforts and current interests of the international
community in determining the fate of South Sudan would also make it almost
impossible to maintain any authoritarian state in South Sudan.
With its record of successful and unsuccessful secessionist
movements, the Horn of Africa cannot afford another state failure. Potentially
detrimental to the future ambitions of Somaliland, another democratic
albeit not yet recognized as de jure state that has declared
independence, the current South Sudanese crisis may indicate that secession is
not a panacea for all divided nations. In view of the experiences of Eritrea
and South Sudan, Somaliland must be aware that secession is not a guarantee for
peace and democratic stability. This may be used to suppress secession
movements in Darfur and other areas in the region.
Above all, IGAD, the AU and the
international community need to ensure that the political leadership of the
SPLM and the military command of the SPLA take reform seriously. For the long-term
stability of Africa's newest nation, democratization is necessary, but also
insufficient. Delivery of public services and economic development will be
critical. It is for this reason that the transformations of the SPLM into a
democratic party, and the reform of the SPLA into a state army, are
prerequisites for a stable South Sudan. While the situation in Somalia
remains fragile, the Republic of Sudan and the State of Eritrea face a
precarious future. Most dreadful for the entire region, however, is the
possibility of another state failure in the form of South Sudan.
POST-WESTPHALIAN CONCEPTION OF
PEACEKEEPING Understanding
peacekeeping’s core argument is that of the ongoing and resolved tension
between those that see peacekeeping’s role in global politics in Westphalia
term ( i.e. state sovereignty) and those who see it as an ambitious post
Westphalia term (i.e. liberal democracy) lies in the heart of many theoretical
and practical difficulties that today’s peacekeepers are experiencing. Hence, before we go into discussing
the post-Westphalia conception, we need to briefly give some definitions of the
term peacekeeping. This will provide us with a comprehensive introduction to
the concept of Westphalia.
Many scholars have made various
attempts in defining peacekeeping according to a former United Nations
secretary general B.B Ghali in his book titled “An Agenda for Peace” represents actions taken to bring hostile
parties to an agreement. Also,
peacekeeping which according to Isumonah entered the language of international
politics in the 1950s is characterized by the international peace academy (IPA)
as “the prevention or containment,
moderation and termination of hostilities between states through the medium of third party
intervention organized and directed internally using multinational ,military
police and civilian personnel to restore peace (Adeleke, 1995).
Peacekeeping was
also defined by Gouldig as the field operation established by the United
Nations with the consent of the parties concerned to help and control at the
expense collective of the member states and with military and other personnel
equipment provided voluntarily by them and acting impartially between the
parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary (Goulding, 1993).
The
Westphalia thinking underlying the UN discourse during the Cold War, and which
An Agenda for Peace tries to challenge moderately, assumes that belligerents
are sovereign states that defend their territorial integrity in war. War is
fought mainly over national interests who exist for political elites and
national decision-making bodies to be discovered and interpreted. War can be
distinguished from peace, because war is, as Clausewitz argues, a continuation
of politics by other means.
In the light of the above
definition we can begin to explain the Westphalia conception of peacekeeping.
Westphalia which is defined by its belief in the primary of the sovereign
autonomy and non-intervention, can be described as the principle of
international law and that each nation-state has sovereignty over its territory
and internal affairs to the exclusion of all external powers in the principle
of non-interference in another’s domestic affairs and that every state is equal
in international law (William mock) Westphalia conception is named after the
peace treaty of Westphalia signed in 1648, which ended the thirty years war in
which the continental European states which comprised of - the Holy Roman
Empire, Spain, France, Sweden, and the Dutch republic agreed to respect one
another’s territorial integrity. The 1648 Peace of
Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years War, created an international order
based on individual and sovereign nation-states. The United Nations is an
international organization composed of member states. Krasner (1999, 20)
bases his definition of Westphalia sovereignty on two principals
“territoriality and the exclusion of external actors”. Essentially, Westphalia
sovereignty is a “norm of nonintervention in internal affairs” (Krasner 1999,
20). The norm of sovereignty led to the creation of an international system in
which nonintervention and sovereignty are the main principals (Bellamy et al
2009, 21). These principals created an environment in which the state is the
ultimate authority.
The current international system, in
which the state is the ultimate authority and nonintervention into the affairs
of states is the norm, is known as the Westphalia model (Krasner 1999, 23). The
Westphalia model shaped an environment in which states must consent to external
assistance, such as humanitarian assistance or a peacekeeping operation.
Failure to achieve consent before conducting a foreign operation within a state
is considered to be a violation of states‟ sovereignty and is illegal.
The Westphalia model is the
prevailing model of the international system. States are constantly invoking
the principals of sovereignty and nonintervention when confronted with change.
The Westphalia model of states dictates that any external assistance, including
peacekeeping operations, must come at the request of the sovereign. The norm of state sovereignty resulted
in a profound impact on creating and maintaining peacekeeping operations.
Sovereignty has become and remains a core principle of peacekeeping. According
to Bellamy et al (2009, 96) the core principals of peacekeeping, or the “holy
trinity” are consent, neutrality and the defensive use of force. Bellamy et al
2009 echo the internationally recognized core principals of peacekeeping of
consent, neutrality and the defensive use of force.
The
Westphalia conception is therefore a historic fact that represented a new
diplomatic agreement and order created by states for states and replaced most
legal vestiges of hierarchy. This in other words means sovereignty was the
crucial element in peace treaty of Westphalia. It is the international
agreement that were intended to end a great war and promote a coming peace.
Those who seek peace in Westphalia terms argue that its role in international
politics should be limited to ensuring peaceful settlements and the promotion
of orderly relations between states. From this perspective, the ideological
persuasion and political organization within states should not concern
peacekeepers unless it directly threatens international order and the
maintenance of peace and security within states. According to Bellamy, the
line between war and peace is difficult to draw, and thereby, the UN peace
operations have to be able to facilitate the transformation process. The
concept of ‘complex peace operations’ tries to grasp the complexities of
post-Westphalian warfare by suggesting that both peace building.
Hence, as popular and effective
either Westphalia conception was made to be, globalization and the threat to
international peace and security which may be caused by violent conflict and
illiberal governance is altering the environment in which peacekeepers operate
and has encouraged a new development in international peacekeeping operations.
This has led to the emergence of scholars who have questioned the effectiveness
of Westphalia concept of peacekeeping. These people began to look for an
alternative solution to solving the world problem. They came up with a concept
that has been referred to as the post Westphalia concept of peacekeeping.
According to this conception, peacekeeping goes beyond monitoring a ceasefire
agreement between states to take on the role of managing transitions within
states from a violent past to a liberal democratic future. This conception
assumes that the way that a particular state conducts its international affairs
is connected to the nature of its democratic society. This conception proceeds
that threats to international peace and security are not limited to acts of
aggression between states but they also result from violent conflict and
illiberal governance within them. So while Westphalia order rested on a notion
of sovereignty that granted state the protection from interference from
outsiders, post Westphalia undermines sovereignty of state and in turn protects
international peace and security itself.
According
to Ghali A new approach to peace operations, which relies on the
post-Westphalia thinking on warfare has emerged gradually in the UN discourse
too. An Agenda for Peace notes that there are new dimensions of insecurity that
spring up from new assertions of nationalism, ethnic, religious, social,
cultural and linguistic strife. Wars between states have become less frequent
and the most prominent conflict type is internal war. According to the
document, ‘the time of absolute sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory
was never matched by reality’, and this sets challenges for the state system in
general and for the UN peace operations in particular. The challenge does not,
however, mean that the fundamental premises of the state system have to be
questioned. Rather, the states have to strengthen their sovereignty by all
possible means. It is recognized also that the United Nations operations are
not always deployed into post-conflict situations, but try to create them. It
follows, according to the Brahimi Report, that peace building is an important
element of ‘complex peace operations’ where the transformation from war to
peace is assisted. In
view of the above, we hereby submit that peacekeeping in global politics of
today cannot solely be achieved depending on a particular concept. The world
keeps changing and so peacekeeping has to keep it with the changing world to
effectively protect the emergence of violent conflict and to be able to provide
necessary tools for its management
NIGERIA’S
INVOLVEMENT IN PEACE PROCESS IN SUDAN
Since independence in 1960, Nigeria has grown to be widely
recognized in the international community as an unrelenting advocate of global
peace. The principles and objectives of Nigerian Foreign Policy since
independence made it mandatory for the country to be an active participant in
global as well as African regional Peace Support Operations (PSOs).
Furthermore, as a nonaligned country during the Cold War years, Nigeria
maintained a neutral position, which made her a dependable mediator and courted
participant in the forces raised to restore and maintain peace in conflict
zones (Sule:2013).
Over
the past twenty-five years, Nigeria has evolved from a relatively obscure
position under colonial domination to a major power in international affairs.
This position as well as the commitment underpinning it, has been expressed
more forcefully in the defense of Africa which, in cooperation with other
countries within the continent and in the Diaspora, has helped in keeping alive
the pan-African ideal. Thus between 1960 and 2005, Nigeria has been actively
involved in various ways in the struggle against colonialism in Southern
Africa; in demonstrating the cultural richness and diversity of Africa (FESTAC);
in building and maintaining peace throughout the West African region; and in
helping to establish, and continuing to support the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS (1975)) the Organization of African Unity (OAU (1963),
now AU (2001)), the Non-Aligned Movement, and other organizations concerned
with bringing peace to regions and peoples across the world. It was in defense
of these objectives that Nigeria broke off diplomatic relations with France in
1961 over the latter’s nuclear tests in the Sahara desert. Similarly, its
membership of the “Frontline States” during the struggle against Rhodesia (now
Zimbabwe) and apartheid South Africa; its long-term chairmanship of the UN
Special Committee against Apartheid; and its leadership of peacekeeping
missions in Chad (1979-82), Liberia (1990-98), Sierra Leone (1996-00), and Cote
d’Ivoire (2000-Date) are all reflections of its commitment and role to peace
building, peace keeping, and conflict resolution.
The role of Nigeria
in maintaining peace and security in Africa cannot be overemphasized. The DRC,
Rwanda and similar events across Africa send chilling signals that the
international community is either too tired of Africa’s conflicts or that the
dominant interests within it are busy fanning such conflicts in the struggle to
control resources. In either case, there seem to be a general fatigue and
reluctance to intervene in Africa’s conflicts. Africa must seize the
opportunity, within a reformed, democratic Security Council that gives all
peoples irrespective of race, an equal status and voice in the management of
world affairs. This is precisely why we need to squarely reject the current
calls from certain quarters in the Nigerian foreign policy community and their
international collaborators for a disengagement from Africa’s problems based on
the spurious and untenable position that just as economic liberalization
requires a minimalist, non-interventionist state domestically, so too is a
minimalist state required internationally. Since Nigeria, so the argument goes,
is facing enormous domestic economic difficulties, it should draw back into its
shell and face its own problems (Okpokopo: 1999).
he intensity and destructiveness of
Africa’s conflicts accelerated tremendously, posing complex challenges to the
peaceful resolution of conflict in particular, and the advancement of peaceful
co-existence between groups in general (Adar, 2004:247). Put differently, most
visible manifestation of the problems facing the continent is the invidious and
intractable proliferation of conflict. In the view of Akinsanya (2005:109),
Africa continued to witness protracted civil wars which have taken the center
stage in the political lives of the continent, with attendant devastating
consequence for peace, security and sustainable development. Put simply,
the past and recent events in the Darfur region of Sudan reveal that
ethno-religious conflict, as ever before, still very much predominate in the
contemporary world. As tension and
unrests continued to escalate in Sudan, Nigeria as expected, became involved in
the UN peace-keeping operations aimed at bringing peace to the troubled
Sudanese region. This paper thereby seeks to evaluate and examine the
involvement of Nigeria in peacekeeping operations in the Sudan.
CHALLENGES FACED BY
NIGERIAN CONTINGENT IN SUDAN
The absence of a Peacekeeping operation policy or
training doctrine - Nigerian sent its troops to peacekeeping mission under the
AMIS and UNAMID without properly articulated and focused goals (Ngwube, 2013).
A peacekeeping policy will help in strategic planning and deployment in
Nigeria’s peacekeeping operations. A clearly-stated policy and training
doctrine would impact positively on all aspects (organization, training, leader
development and selection of soldiers) of the Nigeria Armed Forces preparations
for deploying peacekeepers (Sule, 2013).
Budgetary,
Logistical and Administrative Constraints - Peace keeping operations are
expensive and the UN standard of operation requires contingents from troop
contributing countries to be self-sufficient for 60 days (Ngwube, 2013).
Conditions of deployment of Nigerian contingent in Sudan were not put into
consideration alongside with the necessary numbers needed in field operations;
therefore Nigerian peacekeepers were not able to understand their duties in the
field. Parties in the conflict have
taken advantage of this weakness (Ngwube, 2013). Administrative and budgetary
constraints crippled the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The successful
accomplishment of tasks or mandate given to Nigerian contingent depends mostly
on reliable equipment and adequate funds (Sule, 2013). The nature of logistical
constraints faced by Nigerian contingent is lack of sufficient quantity of
vehicles, lack of adequate medical facilities, insufficient communication
equipment, and individual soldier kitting (Sule, 2013). The African Union
Mission did not possess adequate instruments to meet the challenges in Darfur.
The Mission was poorly funded and ill-equipped to effectively cover the entire
area of Darfur. This brings us to the fact that the logistical and financial
troubles of the Organization, and the size of the force have made the A.U.
Mission inefficient (Ebegbulem, 2011).
Mandate
- A clear and realistic mandate is expedient for the success of a
peacekeeping mission. The mandate in Darfur generated criticism regarding the
N’djamena agreement which was seen as insufficient and did not make adequate
provision for the protection of civilians and said it was the duty of the
Sudanese government to offer security for the population. The AMIS mandate
though limited did not put into consideration funds and troop available for the
fulfillment of the mandate. According to Ebegbulem (2011), the limited mandate
of AMIS for monitoring the ceasefire agreement has not been effective because
it lacked enforcement mechanism. Some
had rightly observed that AMIS ‘protection by presence’ strategy had not been
effective so far, as protection of vulnerable civilians cannot be guarantee in
an event of an escalation of security threat (ICG 2005 cited in Ngwube). A
representative from the non-governmental organization (NGO) community noted
that, there is a lot of confusion among Sudanese civilians and humanitarian aid
organizations about the exact role the of the African Union mission (Ngwube,
2013).
CHALLENGES
OF NIGERIA’S PARTICIPATION IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATION
Nigeria is a firm believer
in the indivisibility of peace and security in Africa. The country affirms that
a threat to peace anywhere in Africa is a threat to peace everywhere on the
continent." By extension, any African nation at war and in distress is
also a threat to world peace and security. Nigeria holds the view that Africa
cannot meet the challenges of poverty reduction and the elimination of
diseases, unless there is peace and security in Africa; hence her commitment in
resolving the conflict in Darfur, Sudan. Nigeria has committed both human and
material resources in her effort to resolve the crisis in Darfur. The country
organized several meditative meeting under the auspices of the African Union
and the United Nations which resulted in the consensus on the Declaration of
Principles in which the conflicting parties, namely the Central Sudanese
Government and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement agreed on the
principle and conditions for self-determination for the Southern Sudan. The
self determination of Southern Sudan today as an independent sovereign state is
the dividend of many peace initiatives advanced by Nigeria intended to
facilitate the resolution of the Darfur Crisis.
In
the view of Saliu, (1998:110), “while it is true that the country had
demonstrated her peace-keeping role in the1970s and 1980s through the UN and
OAU, the decade of the 1990s has witnessed a significant expansion in the
circumference of Nigeria’s participation in peace-keeping operations. In that
way, Nigeria has contributed immensely to the Sudanese peace process
particularly through the platform of international organizations; the country
has sought to give practical expression to its objective of foreign policy
dealing with the maintenance of international peace. Having
said this, the number one challenge been faced by the peace effort was the
activity of the government-sponsored Janjaweed - The Sudanese Government
launched a total military defeat on the rebels.
In the process, it allegedly armed the Janjaweed militia, to fight the
government's cause. As a result of the fighting, many people, mostly civilians,
have been killed, while over one million people have been displaced from their
homes (Deng, 1995). How then could peacekeepers launch an attack on a
legitimate government? Part of
the challenges that Nigeria encountered was that the African Union Mission
which she led does not possess adequate instruments to meet the challenges in
Darfur. The Mission is poorly funded and ill-equipped to effectively cover the
entire area of Darfur. Many African countries are faced with domestic problems
and challenges that they find it difficult to contribute troops or equipment.
Those who have the personnel lack the means to deliver and maintain them. This
brings us to the fact that the limited mandate of the A.U. force, logistical and
financial troubles of the Organization and the size of the force have made the
A.U. Mission inefficient. The deployment of the AU force, even though small,
took many months after the signing of the agreement by the Sudanese Government
and the rebels. Moreover, even the limited mandate for monitoring the ceasefire
agreement has not been effective. The mandate has no enforcement mechanism, and
the exposure to HIV/AID by the peacekeepers. As
earlier mentioned, one of the most important yet unspoken challenge been faced
by peacekeepers is the high infection rate amongst returning Nigerian
peacekeepers regarding sexually transmitted diseases, especially the HIV/AIDS
virus. A study done in 2005 by the U.S. Naval Health Research Center determined
that the Nigerian military had an estimated infection rate of about 15%, as
compared to about 5% in the general Nigerian civilian population (Ekong, 2012).
Additionally, the chances of becoming infected with HIV/AIDS dramatically
increased with the number of years deployed, from about 7% with one year to
about 15% with three years of duty on peacekeeping missions. Part of this may
be attributable to the increased likelihood of being directly exposed through
wounds to HIV/AIDS contaminated blood. The
inherent dangers of an HIV/AIDS infected military population could potentially
be very dangerous and destabilizing. In most instances, Nigeria keeps the
HIV/AIDS infected military members on active duty. This results in a drop in
combat readiness of the total force. Other issues, mostly speculative at this
point, involve the emotional state of infected military members who increase
their levels of high-risk activity knowing that their lives have become
dramatically shortened. This may also include a willingness to engage in
potentially illegal activity in an attempt to obtain money to pay for treatment
normally unaffordable to the average soldier.
HIV/AIDS has therefore been identified as the leading cause of death in
both the military and police forces in several African nations, including
Nigeria. The
socio-economic as well as the political implications of Nigeria’s participation
in peacekeeping are also important. This is because the cost of mounting any
peacekeeping is monumental. It certainly affects the economy because the
resources diverted to the peacekeeping operation could be used for other
developmental purposes. It will affect other needs of the society. Therefore,
it is generally perceived as an unnecessary diversion especially if the huge
amount involved does not bring any benefit directly to the nation mounting the
operation as Nigeria did in all its operations except those led by the UN. Equally, just as it drains the economy,
the social dislocation to the nation is Another factor. Nigerian soldiers who
have been deployed for long periods away from their families have frequently
returned home with serious physical and mental ailments causing anguish to
their families in particular and the nation at large. This means that long-term
peacekeeping deployments have the potential of impacting negatively on quite a
lot of families. Studies of Nigerian forces participating in the Liberian and
Sierra Leonean operations attest to this fact.
Politically, the ECOMOG operations have questioned Nigeria’s sensitivity
to the plight of the ordinary Nigerians who are in need of better standard of
life. National resources were expended without the consent of the people. At
the end of operations nothing came back financially or materially to the
Nigerian People as a dividend. Although the nation is committed to Africa Union
committee of states, it does not mean that the national leadership should not
take the feelings of the ordinary citizens into consideration when undertaking
such costly interventions. Another challenge to continued
peacekeeping support is that Nigeria faces problems regarding adequate military
funding. This has an impact in supporting ongoing and future peacekeeping
operations. Nigeria is not alone in this category, as fiscal pressures
regarding military funding are widespread throughout Africa. The fragile
economies of the continent’s nation-states are poorly situated to man, train
and equip their military and police forces in support of the numerous
peacekeeping missions. Consequently, these conditions contribute to the
fielding of forces that are haphazardly screened and poorly trained for
important out-of-area deployments in support of UN missions. Additionally, much
of the equipment fielded in support of peacekeeping operations by many of the
African nations, including regional leader Nigeria, is in substandard condition
due to age and lack of maintenance. Nigeria spent only 1% of its Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) on its military in 2010, as compared with 4.8% by the U.S. during
the same period. Like other militaries in Africa, Nigerian soldiers remain
underfunded and poorly positioned to correct past deficiencies in manning,
training and equipping individual personnel and units for peacekeeping
operations. Factors such as this posed
challenge to peacekeeping operation in Sudan. Language
barrier is another major problem posed to NA personnel in PSO. For instance, in
Chad (1979-1980 and 1982-1983) there was language barrier and the Nigerian
military had to get interpreters in order to communicate with the host nation
and peacekeepers from non-English speaking countries. This same problem exists
today in Darfur (UNAMID) and Mali (AFISMA), though at a lower level as some NA
personnel understand and speak passable French and Arabic. Nigeria therefore
needs to encourage more of its personnel to learn French, Portuguese, Spanish
and Arabic to mention but just a few. As Part of the challenge facing Nigeria in recent years, and as seen in the Sudan
mission is perceived corruption regarding payment of deployed Nigerian military
members in support of peacekeeping operations.
For instance, in order to incentivize African countries supporting
peacekeeping operations, the UN reimburses governments supporting these
missions based upon a stipend per member and piece of equipment actually
deployed. However, the perception within the military is that Nigerian
officials seem to be skimming these payments, reducing the reimbursement to the
military establishment and shortchanging the personnel participating in
peacekeeping operations. The response to the perceived government corruption is
beginning to grow.
In 2008, Nigerian soldiers returning from peacekeeping
operations in Liberia converged on the Nigerian town of Akure, located 300km
east-northeast of Lagos, and effectively shut it down in protest over the
perceived pay skimming. Instead of the almost $7,400 per soldier total for the
six month deployment in UN allowances they expected (based upon the UN
advertised stipend of $1,228 per soldier per month), they received only $3,000
from the Nigerian government (HUHUADMIN, 2012). In June Nigerian soldiers on a
peacekeeping operation in Darfur, Sudan lodged a protest and forwarded a petition
while on deployment, arguing to be paid their allowances and to be sent home
right away. This was because their original six-month mission was extended by
an additional month due to lack of return transportation.
BENEFIT OF NIGERIA’S ENGAGEMENT IN
PEACEKEEPING OPERATION
Despite the problems and
costs confronting Nigeria’s peacekeeping efforts it has continuously sent
troops to PSOs. Nigeria routinely ranks in the top five countries contributing
troops to UN peacekeeping operations. As previously noted, the Armed Forces of
Nigeria have achieved international recognition for their admirable
performances in peacekeeping operation. It is worthy to note that Nigeria’s
engagement in peacekeeping operation has not been all about father Christmas
policy, as we will be seeing in this work there are numerous benefit accrued
from her engagement.
It
is important to note that peacekeeping has become a proxy for training in terms
of acquiring practical experiences. It serves as a continuous on the field
training experience. The challenges in the mission area provide opportunities
for more practical experiences of soldering. In an era in which military
hardware is being improved through testing on a daily basis, peacekeeping
deployments also serve to test the familiarity of Nigerian troops with modern
weapons.
Firstly,
Nigeria benefited economically from peacekeeping operation such benefit
mentioned was the UN Troop Contributing Country (TCC) financial reimbursement
program. Through this program, the UN compensated the Nigerian Government for
“raising, training and sustaining” her deployed peacekeeping forces. There is always an economic
dimension to any country’s foreign policy calculation including contributing to
peace operations where there are pecuniary gains to Nigeria as well as
individual participants involved in UN missions. These financial benefits
contribute to the socio-economic welfare of soldiers and sometimes, Nigeria’s
military. As such, reimbursements that accrue from Nigeria’s participation in
UN peacekeeping have been a source of income for soldiers and the state. For
example, reimbursement for use of major equipment and provision for
“self-sustainment” for the initial two battalions deployed in UNAMSIL from 27
December 1999 to 26 January 2000 amounted to US $798,063.13
(Ahmed, 2013). In UNAMSIL, the UN troops allowance paid to the TCC was
US$1,349 per troop per month. Of that, Nigeria pays
a flat rate of $600.00 to officers and soldiers while retaining for its
national treasury US$740 per soldier.
Secondly,
peacekeeping has become an avenue for training and a platform for members of
the Nigerian Armed Forces to gain practical experiences. The challenges of
modern peace operations provide opportunities for more practical experiences of
soldering, including the chance to test the familiarity of Nigerian troops with
modern weapons. Joint and combined training has also been achieved in the
various missions. These have afforded Nigerian troops the chance to mix with
other armed forces, thereby encouraging training and learning from their
organization, tactics and methods of operation.
Collaborative and peacekeeping
related capacity-building and training programs that Nigerian troops have
benefitted from include the US African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and
African Contingency Operation Training and Assistance (ACOTA), France’s
Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping capabilities programme (RECAMP), and
Canada’s Military Training Assistance Programme (MTAP). Given Nigeria’s
resource constraints, these training programs have enabled its soldiers to
improve their skills and knowledge to reach advanced international military and
policing standards. This has impacted positively on their professional
expertise and capabilities and enhanced their operational performance. Nigeria’s
role in peacekeeping has also developed very professional military commanders.
Since its involvement in UN peacekeeping operations beginning in 1960, Nigeria
has had 25 of its general officers selected for duties as Peace Support
Operations (PSO) Force Commanders.33
Recently,
the Joint African Union (AU)/UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) was commanded by
Nigerian General Martin Luther Agwai, who turned over the position successfully
in 2009.
Additionally,
Nigerian peacekeepers and their leadership received high accolades after supporting global missions such as the UN Protection Forces
(UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia in 1992. Currently, Nigerians are involved
in the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), including key leadership
positions. While supporting global peacekeeping operations, the
Nigerian military continues to play an important role in internal security and
carries out functions traditionally reserved for the police. As a result of
these efforts, the populace has a greater trust in its military. In a 20 April
2012 editorial to the Nigerian Sunday Tribune, a reader indirectly
praised the Nigerian Army, commenting on the Nigerian Police’s demand for new
uniforms. He mentioned, “The Nigerian Army has never changed its uniform, yet
it is not found wanting when it comes to efficient discharge of its duties.
Besides, it is known for discipline, commitment and dedication to duties.”35
Accolades for the military vis-à-vis their peacekeeping role have even garnered
praise from the Nigerian President, Goodluck Jonathan.
In public comments at a
promotion ceremony in December 2010 for new Nigerian Navy and Air Force Flag
Officers, President Jonathan stated that the world at large was looking to
Nigeria to help settle the political situation in Cote d’Ivoire. He went on to
say; “We have to thank the [Nigerian] military for keeping the country together
[Cote d’Ivoire]. You have shown leadership in the whole of Africa.”36 President
Jonathan received calls from leaders worldwide praising Nigeria for helping to
resolve the situation in Cote d’Ivoire. He also said; “That tells you how
others rate Nigeria and we have no reason to derail. I have to commend the
military for doing that. Accolades received from different quarters including the UN and some
African leaders’, serves as morale booster to Nigerian peacekeepers, a
condition that made Nigeria highly respected among peers.
Other
political benefits that Nigeria gained for its consistent leadership role in peacekeeping
efforts include assignment to prominent positions within the UN leadership
system. For example, Professor Ibrahim Gambari (mentioned earlier) was the
Special Representative for the Secretary General (SRSG) in Angola and Darfur,
and Ambassador Olu Adeniji, later the Nigerian Foreign Minister, was the SRSG
for the Central African Republic and Sierra Leone missions.40 As a result of
its proven leadership, Nigeria plays a prominent international role in
representing Western African affairs. This role was further highlighted in a
paper delivered at the workshop on Nigeria and the Reform of the United Nations
in 2005. In it, Muhammad Juma Kuna, Head of the Department of Sociology, Usmanu
Danfodiyo University, Sokoto, Nigeria, asserted that Nigeria’s sustained
peacekeeping efforts regionally make it uniquely qualified to represent Africans
continent-wide and globally (Muhammad, 2012).
Colonel Taiwo, quoting Professor
Ibrahim Gambari (a prominent Nigerian scholar and diplomat, currently assigned
as the joint AU/UN Special Representative for Darfur), noted that “Nigeria
remains one of the UN[s] important and long standing contributors” to
peacekeeping missions. This regional leadership has elevated Nigeria’s
international influence as witnessed by its increasing inclusion as a
non-permanent member in the U.N. Security Council.
CONCLUSION
Since
gaining independence in the 1960’s, Nigeria’s interest and commitment to world
peace has put her in the forefront of troop contributing countries in support
of global, regional and sub-regional peacekeeping operation . This was informed
by Nigeria’s placement of peace and security of Africa as the focal point of
its foreign policy. Nigeria has participated in peace keeping operations under
the authority and mandates of the UN, AU (former OAU) and ECOWAS. Its armed
forces have been deployed to peacekeeping operations as either a single
service, principally the Nigerian Army, or jointly with the Nigerian Air Force
and/or the Nigerian Navy. Obviously, it has been the Nigerian Army that has
borne the brunt of Nigeria’s involvement in peacekeeping operations. This piece
looked at the challenges, as well as the benefit therein in Nigeria’s
involvement in peacekeeping.
Though
Nigeria’s participation in peacekeeping in Sudan is significant, the country
has not really come to terms with realities of new global polities. The country
has to form a practical policy on the deployment of peacekeeping operation
taking into consideration the reluctance of dominant global powers to be
involved in African security issue, the importance of mass mobilization to
support peacekeeping effort and the conduct of the domestic economy
(Abdulwaheed, 2012). Nigeria stays committed to the peace process through thick
and thin in the Darfur Region of Sudan. Although the crisis in Darfur continued
to defy all efforts aimed at achieving a lasting peace, but the commitment of
Nigeria to the peace process in the region is commendable. Relieve may have
eventually come the way of parties to the crisis with the independent status
granted to Southern Sudan, but the strategic role that Nigeria played in the
process cannot be ignored. This further explains Nigeria’s big brother role on
the continent of Africa and also lends credence to the assertion that Nigeria
remains a significant actor in global peace keeping.
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