The Boko Haram Conflict In Nigeria

Terrorism remains an elusive concept. The term terrorism, like globalism, is difficult to define and has a diversity of meaning among different groups and individuals. Basically, terrorism can be generally referred to as violent acts against a civilian population and/or non-state actors irrespective of their political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic and religious motives (Idowu, 2013). Case, 2011 sees terrorism as the use of violence against civilians and is perpetrated by non-state actors with the intent of achieving some political
outcome. Both international terrorism (often called state sponsored) and domestic terrorism have bedeviled the peace, stability, governance and development of many nations just as in the case of the 9/11 2011 attack on the twin towers of New York city led by Osama Bin Laden, the activities of Al-Qaeda (in Sudan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Europe, America, Africa, Asia, etc), ISIS, Taliban, Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Hezbollah (in Iraq, Iran, Israel, etc), Hamas group (in Palestine middle East Gaza strip and neighboring Arab countries), Al-Fattah (in Tunisia, Algeria, Lebanon, China and North Korea), Ku Klux Klan, Al-Shabaab, etc. 

In this paper, Boko Haram insurgency is classified as both domestic and international terrorism because it thrive on the use of violence, generally in an indiscriminate manner, to harm, cause distress and inflict fear upon the population in Nigeria especially the North-East, Chad, Niger and Northern Cameroon. Thus, the religious-ideological motivation for terrorism has been demonstrated by the Boko-Haram insurgents in the Northern parts of Nigeria since 2002.

The Jama’atul Alhul Sunnah Lidda’wati wal Jihad, or “people committed to the propagation of the prophet’s teachings and jihad,” (Abolurin, 2012) popularly called Boko Haram, which literally means “Western education is a sin” was initiated in 2002 by a young man called Mohammed Alli (People Monthly, 2012). Mohammed Alli’s vision was to have an Islamic Nigeria, and he began with the concept of achieving it through setting up a modern Islamic state somewhere in the desert of Yobe state. When he had set up that, he invited his friend, Mohammed Yusuf, who later became the leader of Boko Haram. 

In a sense it could be argued that Boko Haram started as a fundamental Islamic sect that intends to supplant government structures that politicized, corrupted and bastardized proper implementation of sharia in the North and to install Islamic regime where sharia law will be applied to the letters. But following the death of its founder, Mohammed Yusuf in July, 2009 while in custody of the Nigerian Police, the leadership of the group became nebulous (Abolurin, 2012).

Presently, the media have reported that the group’s leader is Abubakar Shekau and have recently pledged allegiance to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Boko Haram’s activities include kidnapping, suicide bombings, beheadings, stealing of food and clothing items including capture of military vehicles, hardware and equipments, burning of Churches, mosques and government establishments. 

The activities of the group have caused mass relocation of non-indigenes and business concerns in the North, demolition of economic and social infrastructures, sowed the seed of mistrust, antagonism and disunity between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria, have debilitating effect on Nigeria’s Federal arrangement e.g the NYSC, brain drain of professionals and have given Nigeria a bad image in the international community.

Boko Haram receives funding through several avenues including abductions, robberies, donations, extortions and financing through its network of alliances with other terrorist organizations. Boko Haram has most likely received funding from Al-Qaida in the Land of Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM, or AQIM). With the help of AQLIM, Boko Haram has reportedly been able to secure additional donations from organizations based in Great Britain and Saudi Arabia.18 Boko Haram also engages in kidnapping for ransom and bank robberies.

OBJECTIVES OF BOKO HARAM

·  One of the ojectives of Boko Haram is to establish strict sharia law in northern Nigeria where the majority of the populations are Muslims. Although 12 Northern states have implemented sharia governance.

·  Boko Haram believes that Democracy is too lenient and violates Islam. The late Boko Haram leader Yusuf preached that a sharia state should be established in Nigeria if possible all over the world, through preaching the faith (dawa).

·   Boko Haram pledged its allegiance to Al-Qaeda. The Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin laden once said, in fact Muslim are obligated to raid the land of the infidels, occupy  them and exchange their system of governance for an Islamic system, barring the practice of that which contradicts the sharia from being publicly voiced among the people as was the case at the dawn of Islam.

CAUSES OF THE BOKO HARAM CONFLICT

Some Nigerians have used religion to explain the Boko Haram acts of violence by simply arguing that there is something in their religion that influences them to undertake violence on a large scale. However, this argument is weak, because there is no significant relationship between being a Muslim and being a terrorist. 

Apart from that, the group attacks both Christians and Muslims. The truth remains that the insurgents are driven by a combination of factors such as poverty, unemployment, bad governance and politics of North-South divide. Other intervening variables such as political rivalry amongst politicians in the Northern States and religion too fuel their activities. 

Aside these, drugs play a vital role in the atrocities committed by the insurgents. It is believed that there is a particular type known for pain killing especially for pains from bullets which is usually administered to everyone going for the operation. Other types of drugs used by members of the sect include marijuana, cocaine and heroin. Although some scholars have linked the Boko Haram crises to the issues of politics, governance, corruption, poverty, and gross injustice (AEPC, 2015).

The Boko Haram radicalization started after the execution of Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Jama’atuAhlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad). There are political, economic, social and security factors that instigated the crisis. The radicalized fanatics had a few number of goals to achieve, which are:

·         To expel the prevailing political establishment,

·         To remove all western influences, and

·         To overthrow the national government and establish an Islamic state in its place.

The issues that led to the crisis can be traced back to values, communication, psychological and resources. The major cause of the crisis is the resource-based issues. The resource-based issues include unemployment, endemic poverty, corruption and loss of hope in the government. The fanatics became disenchanted with the bad governance in the country, particularly at the state and local government levels, where these governments were indifferent to the societal problems. They denounced the type of governance that was seen as a product of western education “Boko” and western style democracy. They also declared it as “Haram”, meaning prohibited in Islam and this gave the sect their name “Boko Haram”.

“Boko Haram” is an ideology providing inspiration to the fanatics living in abject poverty under a set of leaders who concern themselves not with running the country but with simply stealing the country’s oil wealth. The level of corruption they see in a country which has immense material and human resources made them dissociate themselves from the government. Despite the nation’s wealth, citizens have to cover all their basic services themselves: health, education and security. The Emir of Kano, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, when he was the Governor of Central Bank of Nigeria, said deprivation, inequity, poverty and youth unemployment is fueling the Boko Haram insurgency- “Boko Haram capitalizes on popular frustrations with the nation’s leaders.”

The 17th U.S Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Johnnie Carson said “Nigerians are hungry for progress and improvement in their lives, but northern Nigerians feel this need most acutely. Life in Nigeria may be tough for many, but life in the north is grim for almost all.” The drying of Lake Chad brought about unemployment because the northerners are mostly fishermen. Another cause of the crisis is the value-based issues. The values this sect held on to are the prohibition of western education, institutionalization of their version of sharia law in Nigeria, westernization of the Nigerian society and the concentration of the wealth of the country among the members of small political elites mainly in the Christian south of the country.

The psychological issues embedded in the Boko Haram crisis are poverty, unemployment, corruption and illiteracy. The fanatics have been brainwashed into believing that killing fellow humans for the sake of Islam assures them a place in paradise and a reward of 70 virgins and that Islam has everything to do with terrorism and violence.  The execution of their leader Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of the Boko Haram sect violates all rules of engagement and this affected the psychological mindsets and philosophies of the sect.

Lastly, the communication issues came up when the peace talk failed in March, 2013 and government insisted that it will crush Boko Haram and in fact gave a date for the execution of its plan. A communiqué which was given at the end of a meeting of Northern Leaders expressed concern over the activities of Boko Haram and was of the view that the threat posed by Boko Haram insurgency could best be attended to without the attendant attacks on individual rights and on businesses. Most often, the Leadership of the Boko Haram group communicates with the Federal Government of Nigeria through video clips it releases from time to time and in Hausa or Arabic language which can only be translated by few people in the Northern part of Nigeria. Yet, the only medium the Federal Government will communicate with the group is through the public mass media on a general basis and not directly between the group and the Federal Government. The Jonathan government had struggled to put a stop to attacks through imposition of a state of emergency and curfew in affected local governments and joint military task forces accused by some local leaders of attacking civilians.

Recently, the Federal Minister of Information Lai Mohammed said that Boko Haram has been “technically” defeated. The danger is still here because the public is not notified of any single sponsor of Boko Haram that has been arrested by the Nigerian security services and army. This is the root of the deadly tree, and until the root is killed, the tree will not be dead. Dasuki, the former National Security Adviser to the president has hinted that he knows the sponsors; so has the former president, Goodluck Jonathan. We all do believe they have handed over this information to the security services, and we also expect the top-level arrests as soon as possible.

STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS OF THE BOKO HARAM CONFLICT

In every conflict, there are stakeholders. Stakeholders are the parties involved at different stages of a conflict or have an interest in the matter. One way to characterize stakeholders is by their relationship to the effort in question. Stakeholders can be supporters, opponents or indifferent, basically, anyone who has an interest in the conflict can be said to be a stakeholder. They can also provide Atmosphere, expertise, financing and power to a conflict. 

(A) Primary Stakeholders they are seen physically on the surface of the conflict or problem. They are people or groups that stand the chance to be directly affected either positively or negative. From this explanation and for the purpose of this work, the primary stakeholders in the Boko Haram conflict are firstly the members of Boko Haram insurgency with Late Mohammed Yusuf (born 29^th January, 1970 at Girigiri village in Gashua Local Government of Yobe state) as the founding leader (AEPC, 2015). They are a group of people who came together to fight for an Islamic Caliphate. The group was founded by Mohammed Yusuf in 2002. After the death of Mohammed Musa in July 2009, Abubakar Shekau, who was the second-in-command, became the leader of the sect. Since Abubakar Shekau took over, the current insurgency has killed over 20,000 people and displaced about 2.3 million people from their homes. Since 2011, Boko Haram has maintained a steady rate of attacks. The group has also been involved in mass abductions including the kidnapping of over 200 schoolgirls from Chibok in April 2014. In 2013, Boko Haram spilled the conflict to include Chad, Niger and Cameroon.

Another primary stakeholder can be said to be the Federal Government of Nigeria. The Nigerian government, since 2009 have been trying to bring the Boko Haram group down, after they committed a series of attacks basically in Borno State. The Police began an investigation which was named “Operation Flush”. This operation led to the death of some Boko Haram members, which included Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of the Boko Haram sect. In tackling members of the Boko Haram, the Federal Government of Nigeria has declared state of emergency at different times, mobilized the military and also tried to seek support from other countries. Although the Goodluck Jonathan regime was perceived to be incompetent, the Buhari regime seems to be doing what they can to see to the end of the conflict.

(B) Secondary Stakeholders are sometimes called external stakeholders. Most of the time, they have a relationship with the primary stakeholder. They have a standing or hold on the primary stakeholders. Sometimes, they are more involved in the conflicts than the primary stakeholders. When necessary, the secondary stakeholders can also get involved in the conflict. Among the secondary stakeholders are the various State governments in Nigeria especially the affected States and Local governments of affected states. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is one of the secondary stakeholders in the Boko Haram conflict. On March 9, 2015, Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance/loyalty to ISIS. On the 12^th of March, ISIS accepted the allegiance and sent a delegate to Nigeria later in the year, who was actually caught on his way to Nigeria. This in a way makes ISIS a secondary stakeholder.

Nigeria’s neighboring countries, that is Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Benin can also be classified as secondary stakeholders. Although Boko Haram is based in the Northeastern part of Nigeria, these neighboring countries are also affected by Boko Haram and have therefore agreed to fight side by side with Nigeria to destroy its common enemy. Asides being a victim of Boko Haram, displaced people from Nigeria move to these countries as refugees. This serves as a reason to help Nigeria get rid of this menace. Other countries outside Africa have also promised to help in the fight against Boko Haram. The United State of America announced in September 2015 to give Nigeria and her neighbors military aid, which will include military training for its army. France and the United Kingdom have sent military assistance and trainers to Nigeria. China offered Nigeria assistance that included satellite data and possibly military equipment. Israel and Canada also pledged their support.

Religious leaders in Nigeria can also be categorized as secondary stakeholders, this is because in one way or the other, they have voiced out there opinion about Boko Haram. Alhaji Muhammad Garuba Akinola Ibrahim, the Chief Imam of Lagos State has condemned the killings done by Boko Haram and says it is improper for Muslims to commit such a gruesome crime. He went further to insinuate that those who are involved with Boko Haram are not Nigerians. Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor, the President of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) said that he feels that religious leaders in the North and not President Goodluck Jonathan can bring an end to the Boko Haram insurgency. Also, the Nigerian Inter-faith Council that is composed of Christian and Muslim religious leaders and other civil organizations are secondary Stakeholders.

(c) Shadow Party Stakeholder are actors in a conflict who fuel the conflict between the primary stakeholders by providing them with finance, ammunition or just by affiliating with them. While doing this, the actors who are involved try their best to remain anonymous. They mostly have hidden agenda and won’t reveal it to anyone. The shadow party stakeholder can’t be identified except through intelligence gathering. The Shadow Party Stakeholders in the Boko Haram conflict cannot be said to have been identified because no one has really been found guilty. It is however impossible to deny the fact that the Boko Haram have Shadow Party sponsors who provides them not only with money, but also feed them with information.     

IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE BOKO HARAM CONFLICT 

     

Economic Impact

During the President Goodluck Jonathan’s administration in 2013, the Minister of Information, Labaran Maku said that the country spends 27% (almost a thrillion naira) of its budget annually on internal security alone. These are resources that could have been channeled to the rehabilitation of the country’s infrastructure. Monies were disbursed to affected states and to the Military which created an avenue for looting and embezzlement of which the Dasuki arms deal scam is a case in point.

 Boko Haram’s activity in Kano, Kaduna, Bornu, Yobe and Bauchi is gradually changing the economic structure of the whole of northern Nigeria. Our research indicates that if the Violence persists, development in that region will be tampered and the gap between the North and other regions will widen further. The reason is that even before the insurgency, the difference between the North and South in terms of education alone is not a gap but a gulf that will take centuries to fill not to talk of the present state of the northern region especially the Northeastern region. 

The evidence and fast changing indices (in form of changing migration patterns, cost of insurance in the North, mass repatriation of funds, dearth in skilled labour etc) speaks volumes. In economic terms, what the insurrection effects is a systemic distortion of existing economic patterns and structure in the Northern region. For a cause that is neither war nor natural disaster, the nation, according to a recent report by the Human Rights Watch (HRW), lost more than 935 of its human capital between 2009 and 2012. 

In terms of finance and investment, though direct and indirect loses are unquantifiable, a World Investment Report (WIR) of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), estimated that the domestic economy lost a whopping N1.33 trillion Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), owing to the activities of terrorists going by the name ‘Boko Haram’ (Okereocha, 2012:46).

The acting Managing Director, Nigeria Interbank Settlement System (NIBSS), Mr. Niyi Ajao, in an exclusive interview with TELL, lamented the havoc suicide bombers have done to the Nigerian economy which, he said, is affecting everyone and will affect the future generation, if not stopped immediately. According to him, Nigeria is just growing as a country and has not come to the stage where such data could readily be available as quick as people expect it. “But one thing is certain, as soon as all these bombs explode, electronic media – CNN, Associated Press, BBC, Sahara reporters, Channels, Reuters and others quickly flashes them to every part of the world. 

“In fact, each time it happens, friends in UK and USA will always be the ones calling to inform us that something has happened. In the same way, Nigerian prospective investors are hearing all these things. The bombings create fears such that whoever plans to come and invest will draw back. Prospective investors receive the news in such a way that they think the entire country is on fire. There are many businesses, even from the southern part of Nigeria that wanted to set up Branches up in the North but could not anymore. He reminisced on the Kano State of old; “a vibrant commercial centre with huge textile industry, and many other businesses. They have all gone away now” (Suleiman, 2012:44-45).

Hence, for many analysts, Nigeria is a paradox: so peaceful but yet at war, so wealthy but poverty reigns among the majority of its citizens, so endowed but yet so deprived. Counting the cost ever since the activities of the militant group ‘Boko Haram’ assumed horrendous dimension, the loss of properties with commercial value and forfeited local and foreign investment have been of a great disaster to the domestic economy. Some experts believe there are no criteria to quantify the loss to the economy. 


They drew their conviction from the fact that some questions remains unanswered: Does anyone record the numbers of children that have died due to deprivation, after losing parents and guardians? What families have been scattered, and ambitions cut short? In terms of properties, how many estimators and quantity surveyors have visited the scenes of each bomb blast to value the cost of wealth destroyed, abandoned projects and intellectual properties destroyed. 

As such, some have concluded that any figure that is thrown up from any source may be a scratch on the surface. Yet, the HWR report with its scary figures revealed that, last year alone, ‘Boko Haram’ struck 115 times and killed 550 people. Within the first three weeks in 2012, the sect killed 250 people with the deadliest being the coordinated bombings in the ancient city of Kano, which claimed 185 lives. Sometime around August 2012 another 12 people were killed in a shoot-out between the Joint Task Force (JTF) and members of the sect in Maiduguri, Borno State.

On Sunday, February 26 2012, suicide bombers hit a Church in Jos, killing four persons, with another four in a reprisal attack, and destroying 38 vehicles. In the night of the same day, gunmen attacked Shuwa Divisional Police Station in Madagali local government area of Adamawa State, killing three policemen on guard. The number continues to add on a daily basis. 

Aside human lives lost, mass exodus of non-indigenes, whose contributions to the economy of the concerned states is devastating on their economies. This is because in analyzing the importance of factors of production, economists are unanimous on an empirical evidence that where all the factors: Land, Labour, Capital are provided in the right proportion, the absence, or inadequacy of the latest factor of production known as entrepreneur (human capital) will render the other factors useless.

These, in simple terms, point to the fact that less qualified or bad attitude of managers and other employees could destabilize any production process. Specifically, where there are no humans to man the machines, balance accounts, buy and sell or even give directives, nothing will be down as far as production, market and growth are concerned. 

The empirical evidence, most analysts said, means that the human capital/entrepreneurship drain is crippling the Northern economy and there are concerns that it is being transmitted to the Nigerian macro-economic environment. This is because apart from attacks on churches, the sect have also attacked commercial hot-spots like markets, parks, government agencies and even banks, in one of which they harvested N41 million, as recently revealed by the sect’s top shot, Abu Qada, currently in detention (Okereocha, 2012:47). 

Reacting to these developments, the former Minister of Information, Mr. Labaran Maku, said terrorism in places like Kano, which serves as the commercial nerve-centre of not only the North, but neighboring countries like Chad, Niger Republic and Northern Cameroon, is destroying the Northern economy. According to him:

“The attack on Kano is so significant because the city has always been the commercial centre of Western Sudan for the past 500 years, ever before the evolution of Nigeria. So, when you destabilize peace in Kano you threaten the foundation of economic and social well-being of the northern region,” (Suleiman, 2012:48).

Confirming the minister’s assessment on the economy of Kano, immediate past Secretary General of the Kofar Ruwa Traders Association (Iron and Steel Dealers Association), Kano State chapter, Mr. Ethelbert Onuoha, told TELL correspondent, who visited the market, that the market is reputed to be the largest Iron and Steel market in Northern Nigeria and second to Lagos and Onitsha, but not anymore. The volume of transaction has dropped drastically as many buyers are afraid to come to Kano because of the security situation. The same fear has affected the traders from Mali, Chad, and Niger Republic that usually Flood the market on daily and weekly basis. Besides, at the moment, most private and government Construction work in the state are at a standstill.

Historically, each region in Nigeria compliments the other. What the North lacks in access to the sea, the south provides. The North wields 78 percent of Nigeria’s land which supports most of Nigeria’s agriculture (food, cash crops and livestock). The south-west’s terrain supports both domestic and international commerce and provides an import/export rout. While the South-South and some parts of the South-East wield Nigeria’s oil wealth. 

If Boko Haram’s activities persist, this economic symphony will be altered significantly. Farmers in Borno state known to be agrarians have fled in millions in their search of safe haven. Lands for agricultural production have become battle fields of Boko Haram group thus creating hunger and starvation in the region. The rate of serial killings by Boko Haram group and several attacks on prisons, Police and Army stations in Borno, Jos, Yobe, Gombe, Bauchi, Abuja, are enormous evidence of the wanton destruction by the group thus creating a severe setback to the Nigerian Nation. Also, the rate of incessant bombings of markets, schools, motor parks and Government offices have negative effect of engendering poverty, ignorance, primitivism, hunger, diseases, hopelessness and complete misery of life to the people of the region (AEPC, 2015).

The Psychological Trauma on Boko Haram’s Victims

In view of fighting against the government and the people of Nigeria, many people have been affected by the attacks of the Boko Haram insurgents. Many have been killed through bombings and beheadings, some through the usage of gun against their lives by the Boko Haram. And to some, their parents and siblings were kidnapped by the Boko Haram and that created an atmosphere that led to their passing through psychological trauma. 

These incidences are recorded in many instances such as the Chibok girls that were kidnapped, the agony of those living in camps such as the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP Camps) and those who are staying in refugee camps in Cameroon, Niger and Republic of Chad (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 11 November, 2014; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 16 February, 2015; Ayansina, 2015). The menace has caused several killings, distress, depression, anxiety, disorder, health risk (HIV Aids, Tuberculosis and other sexually transmitted diseases), destruction of properties, vehicles, houses and maiming of souls.

In the case of the Chibok Girls, some of their parents were affected as a result of psychological trauma that led to their death since they could no longer cope with the situation as it became unbearable for them. That led them to their early grave. According to Biodun (2014) some of the parents whom their daughters were abducted by the Boko Haram on the 14th of April, 2014 such as Mrs Mary Paul Lalai who could not bear the incidence that took place. She went through psychological trauma and that affected her to an extent that she could not survive but later died of heart attack without seeing her daughter. 


Another parent, Mutai Hona, also died of heart failure as a result of the kidnap of his two daughters who were in the hands of the Boko Haram. This occurred after he watched the video that was released by the Boko Haram on a note that, the girls would be married out without the consent of their parents and some of the girls that were Christians were converted to Islam by the insurgents (Sahara Reporters, 2014). President Jonathan was called upon by several groups both locally and internationally for his led government to rescue the girls from the hands of Boko Haram. Such calls also came from Malala Yousafzai (the Iranian girl) who visited Nigeria on the occasion of her birthday to speak for the girls as her sisters whose voices were not heard (Ehikioya, 2014).

The agony of children as a result of the Boko Haram attacks also remains another level of psychological trauma since the parents could not cater for them as ought to be. According to UNICEF (2015) the displaced children under the care of the UN Agency noted that, over 1.4 million children have been displaced and that they could not take care of them since their number continues to grow beyond what they could do for the children whom about 1.2 million are from Nigeria out of the total number of 1.4 million children. Such are some of the traumas that the people are faced with which reasonably, a call for a resolution of the conflict is very necessary and not just for those who are directly or indirectly affected by the crisis over time. 

Aside these, there is presently a high level of distrust among the Christians and Muslims in the Northern d region as both sides trade accusations on each other as the cause of the insurgency. This distrust has led to enormous psychological violence in the region and leaders of both sides try to preach some level of hatred for the other.

The insurgency constitutes great threat to democratic consolidation in the country and Nigeria’s corporate existence. The Boko Haram scourge constitutes serious threat to national interest, peace and security of the country. The threat by the sect to detonate bombs in Abuja to disrupt the 51st independence anniversary rally scared many Nigerians. Even the government had to cancel the usual ceremony. 

Not only that, the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) passing out parade was equally cancelled because of the threats issued by the sect. Most prospective corps members from the south posted to the North would rather relocate back to their region than serve their father land in the North. Thus, the cancellation of the usual parade of those national events has since set Nigerians wondering at this kind of psychological victory that the federal government has handed to the militant groups. The implications of this intractable problem before the federal government might manifest in precipitating another civil war, thereby leading to the disintegration of the country if not urgently addressed.

Political Impact

Understanding of the group has not been helped by the nature of Nigerian politics. For example, in January 2012 President Goodluck Jonathan announced that Boko Haram had infiltrated the highest levels of politics and the military. The president painted a picture of a puppet group that was being used by aggrieved northern politicians to bring down his southern government. A serving senator accused of having connections with the group was arrested. But President Jonathan’s remarks have been condemned by some observers as political opportunism. 

In Nigerian politics it is a standard maneuver to blame problems on one’s political enemies, even if the situation has nothing to do with them. Following the failed rescue of hostages Chris McManus and Franco Lamolinara in March 2012, President Jonathan shifted his analysis of the group, playing up the connections between the group and international terrorism. He reportedly wrote to the British and Italian governments saying that the Nigerian Government remains resolutely committed to facing up squarely to the challenge of terrorism on our shores and in the international community. 

His language was carefully chosen to downplay the local politics and to not contradict any possible connection between Boko Haram and al-Qaeda. In this letter, he reportedly also suggested the ties between the three nations [should] grow deeper. Observers believe this to be a thinly veiled request for money from the Europeans

RESPONSE ANALYSIS OF THE BOKO HARAM CONFLICT

There is a common consensus in the Nigerian Public sphere that Government’s response to Boko Haram insurgents has been reactionary rather than proactive. Those who share this sentiment argue that Government usually waits for the insurgents to launch attacks on churches, schools, police stations and other public institutions before it reacts. 

In previous years, the Federal Government have declared state of emergency in affected states where the insurgents have strong holds and have attacked several times, yet the insurgents are still attacking both security agents and innocent citizens. What this simply signifies is the fact that the counter-offensive strategy is not yielding the right results. Also, the current increasing attacks of the sect even with the emergence of President Muhammadu Buhari (a Muslim and a Northerner) as the Head of the current civilian dispensation has debunked the myth or belief in some quarters that Boko Haram emergence was particularly targeted to pulling down the defunct President Goodluck Jonathan’s administration and resist southern domination of the helms of affairs in the country.

The government especially during the Jonathan’s administration has explored the option of dialogue with leaders of the sect and promising them amnesty if the sect layed down their arms. However the option did not yielded any positive result due mainly to the fact that members of the sect are somehow anonymous, with no clear cut address of locating them. Even if dialogue occurred between the government team and leaders of Boko Haram, the religious fanaticism of the sect will lead to irreconcilable positions that will make rapprochement elusive. The responses used by the government include:

Avoidance Strategy

The escalation of the insurgency in early 2010 caught the government flat-footed. It initially believed the violence would peter out. (International Crisis Group Africa Report) The Federal Government avoided confronting the Boko Haram crisis at the initial period because it thought the group will fizzle out like others that had emerged in the past. That was a grave mistake the government made.

In the Daily Trust newspaper of August 8, 2013 former President Goodluck Jonathan was quoted by the newspaper, with the caption: “Boko Haram took us by surprise – Jonathan.” Also, on 25 December 2011, President Jonathan said, “the bombing is a burden we must live with. It will not last forever; I believe that it will surely be over.” The former President was also quoted in the Vanguard of 26 December, 2011, with the caption: “Bomb blast: A burden we must live with –Jonathan.” On 23 January 2012, the then Chief of Defence Staff, Air Vice Marshal Oluseyi Petinrin said the militants would soon run out of “idiots” willing to carry out their suicide bombings. That was published in the Punch of 24 January, 2012, with the caption: “Boko Haram’ll soon run out of bombers – CDS.”

The above showed that the Jonathan’s government, rather than putting machineries in motion to address the Boko Haram issue chose to use the avoidance method with the thinking that ignoring the insurgents would make them fizzle out, but that was not to be as the terrorists gathered momentum, with series of bombing renting the air. The crisis snowballed because the FG avoided it initially.

Military Approach

With sustained attack by the insurgent, the Nigeria government decided to tackle the crisis headlong with full military might. With the avoidance strategy failing to yield the needed result, a far reaching military approach became the order of the day as Boko Haram captured several territories in Bornu, Yobe and Adamawa States.

Since 2012, the government has tried to address the challenge on multiple tracks but especially by increasing the defence budget from N100 billion ($625 million) in 2010 to N927 billion ($6 billion) in 2011 and N1 trillion ($6.25 billion) in 2012, 2013 and 2014. Much of these increases was to combat Boko Haram. (International Crisis Group Africa Report)

According to reports available, beginning from 2011, the FG deployed about 3,600 personnel to Maiduguri and other major north-east towns as part of the Joint Task Force (JTF), a special formation of military, police and SSS units. They were supplemented by small contingents from Chad and Niger, members of a Joint Multi-National Task Force (JMNTF) initially created to combat smuggling (see above). The troops, however, were stretched too thin to control the large region.

On 11-12 May 2013, the government sent 2,000 additional troops, accompanied by heavy military equipment, including fighter jets, to Maiduguri. On 14 May Jonathan declared a state of emergency in the North East (Adamawa, Borno and Yobe). In a national broadcast, he ordered the troops to “take all necessary action … [to] end to the impunity of insurgents and terrorists.” (International Crisis Group Africa Report). Boko Haram turned on the heat on the Nigeria troops beginning from 2013. 

The insurgents successfully captured more than half of the Local Governments in Bornu State and declared Islamic caliphate in some of them by hoisting their flag. Several Nigerian soldiers were killed while others fled as the insurgents were more armed than the military. The huge budgets for defence over the years were being diverted as the government did not beef up the military with the right equipment to battle the terrorists.

Towards the end of Jonathan’s administration, the government stepped up its military campaign against Boko Haram and succeeded in recapturing the territories captured by the insurgents. This was done shortly after the 2015 election was postponed to allow the government time to scoop out the insurgents from the nation’s territories. Within six weeks, Boko Haram had been weaken. Jonathan wanted to gain little credibility and win the people’s heart to vote for his re-election, but his success in salvaging some of Nigeria’s territories from Boko Haram did not dissuade the people.

Towards the beginning of the President Muhammadu Buhari’s administration on May 29, 2015, the insurgents appear to be gaining the upper hand as they stepped up bombing territories. Buhari took time to align with its West Africa neigbhours as it sought to adopt multi-approach military tactics against Boko Haram with help from Chad, Niger and Cameroun. The new government stepped up military campaign against Boko Haram and has succeeded in driving them away from the nation’s territories. But Boko Haram seems to have adopted the guerilla tactics, as suicide bombing, especially using the girl child and women in hijab to carry out such devilish attack. Intermittently, the insurgents would attack a village and retreat.

On the Issue of Dialogue

Ever since the Boko Haram menace started, no meaningful dialogue has held between the government and the insurgents towards ending the crisis. Though, there has been clamour for joint problem solving of the issue at hand, nothing has been done. At least, over 20,000 Nigerians have been killed by Boko Haram. Jonathan canceled a move to dialogue with the terrorists over the kidnap of the over 200 Chibok girls over two years ago. The deal for the dialogue was almost being struck before Jonathan’s government backed out.

In July, 2015, the Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria (PFN), backed ‎plans by the Federal Government to dialogue with Boko Haram sect, provided the insurgents are truly ready to surrender and embrace peace. The body urged the government during negotiation with the insurgents, to continue its military operations in the northeast. (Nation Newspaper)

At an interview on Channels Television in October, 2015, Buhari, through his spokesman, Femi Adeshina said that his administration would not beg the Boko Haram terrorist group for dialogue. He maintained that the Federal Government had the capacity to defeat the insurgents through the use of force. According to him, President Buhari’s administration is not opposed to dialogue if the sect wants it and especially if it is with the authentic leadership of the insurgents. (Daily Trust)

During his Media Chat on 30 December, 2015, Buhati said his government is not against dialogue with Boko Haram. He said if a true leader of the insurgent group would show up, he government would be ready for dialogue. The president said he did not want to dialogue with the wrong leader of the group. As at now, no meaningful dialogue has been held between the Nigeria government and the insurgent group. There appears to be suspicion between the government and the insurgent groups. The Federal Government believed it is already winning the war against the terrorists, hence, exhibiting nonchalant attitude to explore the joint problem solving approach to ending the crisis.

Measures used by the Goodluck Jonathan’s led administration in response to the insurgency include poverty alleviation programs, economic development, education and social reforms. The details are the provision of modern basic education schools for the Almajiri and the establishment of nine new federal universities in Northern States. The government also aggressively addressed the challenges of poverty through its youth empowerment program like YouWin, and investing massively in infrastructure to promote economic development. At the height of the insurgency, the government set up an administrative panel to discuss with the insurgents, but they bluntly refused to meet with the government team. The sum of the administrative framework within much of the anti-insurgency policy, which has been implemented, especially within the context of Boko Haram are as follows:

v  Troops have been reinforced through deployment of army personnel, training and the provision of ammunitions. The government has responded and is still responding to the sect’s beligenyency by waging military expedition against it, but thus far, the military finds it very difficult to curb the sect’s activities. Leaking of information to the sect by some ‘bad eggs’ in the ranks and file of the military contributed to this failure.

v  The leadership of the movement has been targeted.

v The international Joint Task Force (JTF) has been put in place.

v The army has taken over the provision of internal security especially in affected areas through the declaration of state of emergency.

v Curfews have been imposed at several times especially in affected states. The government under the defunct President Goodluck Jonathan’s administration declared a state of emergency in Borno at the beginning of 2012. This was extended in May, 2013 to cover the entire North Eastern states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states of Nigeria.

v GSM services were at some point in time banned and later restored.

v Civilian JTFs have been established.

v Road blocks have been set up by the Nigerian Army to monitor vehicular movements along the highways.

v  The Government also responded to the insurgency through appealing for international assistance to combat the domestic terrorism posed by the sect. President Buhari has sought for greater support from France and other friendly nations to combat the challenge posed by the sect to security in the nation. Especially, the appeals to France and other developed countries of the world to assist in the area of getting more intelligence on the sect’s movements, training and sources of arms and ammunitions. The new administration of President Buhari have sought the assistance of bordering African countries of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon which is yielding positive results in the combat at the border level.

v  The latest response of the government under President Buhari manifested in the relocation of the Command and Control Centre of the Military to Maiduguri. This action is geared towards adding impetus and renewed vigour to “Operation Zaman Lafiya”, which is aimed at bringing terrorism and insurgency to an end. An alternate command centre was also being established in Yola, Adamawa State.

The most visible and positive result that the above measures have yielded, is a significant reduction in the scope, but not in the impact of the Boko Haram operations. In terms of scope, the activities of the insurgents are now limited to the North East, however, the impact of the group’s operation is still being felt across the country. The mistake the federal government of Nigeria made in the past was to treat the insurgent group like freedom fighters with legitimate demand, rather than as a terrorist group. This explain why the government have wanted to negotiate with them. However, this approach has failed to yield any significant result because peace negotiations succeed more easily with militant groups pursuing legitimate identity-based grievances. It is easier for government to accept their core demand, which actually strengthens democracy and good governance. From every indication, the demands of Boko Haram insurgent group are not legitimate and compatible with the country’s constitution. Section (1) and section (3) of the Nigerian constitution reads as follows:

Section (1): This constitution is supreme and its provision shall have binding force on all other persons and authorities throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Section (3): If any other law is inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution, this constitution shall prevail and that other laws shall to the extent of its inconsistency be void.

The United States in a statement issued on the 31^st of December, 2015 said the Boko Haram conflict has affected the lives of communities across the Lake Chad Basin region with some 2.5 million internally displaced people and more than 170,000 Nigerian refugees forced to flee their homes. The US government promised to renew their support for Nigeria and other countries in the fight to end the menace of Boko Haram insurgency in terms of advice, intelligence, training, logistical support and equipments saying that much still needs to be done. 

RECOMMENDATION

1.    Boko Haram can only be curtailed by an extra ordinary smart intelligence network not necessarily physical combat with members of the group alone. There is the need for the various apparatuses to share intelligence among one another and coordinate their responses to such intelligence. The defense and intelligence establishments need to seek the cooperation of the security outfits of Nigeria’s neighboring countries. They also need to elicit the cooperation of local communities in the affected areas of their operations. To be able to elicit the cooperation of the local communities, the defense and intelligence establishments need to respect the fundamental rights of the residents.There is also a need for international assistance especially in the areas of intelligence sharing, counterinsurgency operations, the detection of improvised explosive devices, forensic analysis, intelligence gathering and analysis, and the mounting of a de-radicalization programme.

2.    As a matter of urgency, the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria should expose all Boko Haram sponsors (both individuals, groups, organizations) within and outside the country. As a rule, the Nigerian State is allergic to exposing acts of terrorism, much less the biggest players in the vast industry of corruption.

3.    The federal government should commence a national development plan especially for the North East in order to alleviate the high level of poverty and underdevelopment in the area.

4.    The Government of Nigeria should de-emphasize religion in politics by clearly separating political matters from religious matters and run the affairs of the nation as a secular state as stipulated by the constitution of Nigeria in section 10, 38 and 42.

5.    Nigerian government need to take back and control effectively all its borders by all means. The borders have become routes for illegal arms, illegal immigrants, criminals and contrabands. The security establishment should deploy officers to patrol the illegal and regular routes to Nigeria. This cannot be done by one arm of the defense and intelligence establishments. The Nigerian Air Force should be tasked with air patrol; the Navy should handle the maritime sides of the border, and the Nigerian Immigration Service should work with the customs, police and other security agencies in policing the borders. These establishments should be provided with the necessary surveillance, logistical and operational facilities to effectively patrol and manage the borders. Also, there should be inter-service training among the defense and intelligence establishments aimed at coordinated patrol of the borders

6.     

References

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Case, E. S. (2011). Terrorism. In: John T. Ishiyama and Marijike Breuning eds., 21^st Century Political Science: A Reference Handbook. California: Sage Publication.

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People Monthly. (2012). Abuja: May.

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Lubeck, P. (1986). Islam and urban labour in Northern Nigeria: The making of a Muslim working class. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) 2013. Country Reports on Terrorism 2012, 2013. Washington, D.C., US Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism.

Sergie, M. A. and Toni, J. (2013). US Council on Foreign Relations. Available from:  <http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/boko-haram/p25739> [Accessed 3 December 2015].

Boko Haram changes name to West African Province of the Islamic State. Daily Times of Nigeria; 23 April, 2015.

Boko Haram. Encyclopaedia Britannica

Daud, O. (2014). Religious Leaders can end BokoHaram, not Jonathan. Vanguard Newspaper; July 25, 2014.

Morgan, W. (2015). Boko Haram in Nigeria: President Jonathan rejects help from UN forces to Fight Insurgency. International Business Times. 17 April, 2015.

Onuoha, F. C. (2012). (Un)Willing to Die: Boko Haram and Suicide Terrorism in Nigeria. Report: Al Jazeera Centre for Studies.

Human Rights Watch, (2012) "Boko Haram Attacks and Security Force Abuses in Nigeria". Accessed 22/12/2012 from http://www.hrw.org/node/110632/section/7 

The American Foreign Policy Council's World Almanac of Islamism, (2013). Boko Haram. Accessed 22/12/2012 from http://almanac.afpc.org/boko-haram 

U.S. Department of State, (2014) Country Report on Terrorism 2013. Accessed 22/12/2012 from http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/225886.pdf 

Campbell, J. (2014). Why are Boko Haram Fighters Successful. Nigerian Tribune. Accessed 22/12/2012 from http://tribune.com.ng/index.php/columns/backpage/in-out/item/818-why-are-boko-haram-fighters-successful 

Academic Excellence Promotion Center (2015). Operation ROSE-FRI 2015: A special security Workshop for Schools and Institutions in Niger State. Minna: Niger State Ministry of Education.

Boko Haram: The Politics Of A Terror Brand: Brand Power, Vol 2, No 1.

International Crisis Group Africa Report N°216 (2014). Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency: International Crisis Group Africa Report N°216 (2014).

See Daily Trust of 8 August, 2013: Boko Haram took us by surprise – Jonathan

See Daily Trust, 4 October, 2015. FG won’t beg Boko Haram for dialogue – Buhari

See Nation, 7 July, 2015: FG should dialogue with Boko Haram if … -PFN

See Punch, 24, January 2012. “Boko Haram’ll soon run out of bombers – CDS.”

See Vanguard, 26 December, 2012: Bomb blast: A burden we must live with –Jonathan