An Analysis of the Nigerian Niger Delta Conflict

Conflict resolution as a defined field of study was proposed in the 1950s and 1960s. Conflict is disagreements between people that pursue goals of interest. It could be intra psychic, interpersonal, intragroup, intergroup, intra national and international, and intra state and interstate.  At the height of the Cold War, when the development of nuclear weapons and the conflict between the superpowers seemed to threaten human survival, propositions on how to

resolve, manage and prevent a conflict from escalating began to emerge. A group of pioneers from different disciplines saw the value of studying conflict as a general phenomenon, with similar properties whether it occurs in international relations, domestic politics, industrial relations, communities and families or between individuals. They saw the potential of applying approaches that were evolving in industrial relations and community mediation settings to conflicts in general, including civil and international conflicts.

A handful of people in North America and Europe began to establish research groups to develop these new ideas. They were not taken very seriously. The international relations profession had its own categories for understanding international conflict and did not welcome the intruders. Nor was the combination of analysis and practice implicit in the new ideas easy to reconcile with established scholarly institutions or the traditions of practitioners such as diplomats and politicians. Nevertheless, the new ideas attracted interest, and the field began to grow and spread. Scholarly journals in conflict resolution were created. Institutions to study the field were established, and their number rapidly increased. The field developed its own subdivisions, with different groups studying international crises, internal wars, social conflicts and approaches ranging from negotiation and mediation to experimental games.

Conflict resolution ideas were increasingly making a difference in real conflicts as at 1980s. In South Africa, for example, the Centre for Intergroup Studies was applying the approaches that had emerged in the field to the developing confrontation between apartheid and its challengers, with impressive results. In the Middle East, a peace process was getting under way in which negotiators on both sides had gained experience both of each other and of conflict resolution through problem- solving workshops. In Northern Ireland, groups inspired by the new approach had set up community relations initiatives that were not only reaching across community divides but were also becoming an accepted responsibility of local government. In war- torn regions of Africa and South- East Asia, development workers and humanitarian agencies were seeing the need to take account of conflict and conflict resolution as an integral part of their activities.

By the closing years of the Cold War, the climate for conflict resolution was changing radically. With relations between the superpowers improving, the ideological and military competition that had fuelled many regional conflicts was fading away. Protracted regional conflicts in Southern Africa, Central America, and East Asia moved towards settlements.

Our main point of discussion here is on CONFLICT IN NIGER DELTA, NIGERIA.

The history of the Niger Delta region is one characterized with violence and disharmony of various dimensions from ethnic to religion, economic to political patronage and accommodation. The escalating state of violence between the Niger-Delta youths and the Nigerian government is that of the politics of access to the oil fund. The crisis over control of oil resources has assumed different dimension over time, with the state of youth restiveness in the Niger- Delta region. Historically, the search for crude oil in Nigeria goes as far back as 1903 when the mineral survey company began mineralogical studies. Oil spillage was discovered in Araromi (Okitipupa area) some 300km east of Lagos, attracted by this sign, a German company obtained license from the Government in 1908 to exploit the oil deposits. 

The pioneer efforts unfortunately did not last long and the company stopped its operations at the outbreak of the First World War (1914 – 1918) having drilled 15 “wells dry”. Three decades later another major exploration effort was undertaken, the Anglo- Dutch consortium, SHELL D’Arcy (the fore runner of the SHELL Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC) commenced exploration activities in 1937. Having being granted the sole commission right for oil exploration in Nigeria but did not go before the second world war (1939 – 1945) broke out and aborted their operations, the company now decided to limit its operations to the tertiary areas. After having over 80million, SHELL hit oil deposit in commercial quantities at Olobiri (now in Bayelsa state). In 1950, the company started production at the rate of 5,100 barrels per day and this doubled in 1959. 

The scale of monopolistic concession policy was abrogated in 1959 and replaced by exclusive exploration rights which accelerated the place of oil exploration by encouraging the participation of other companies. For instance, being inspired by success of SHELL- BP, Mobil, Chevron Texaco were later jointed in the late sixties(60s) and early seventies(70s) by a few indigenous companies like Henry Stephen, Delta Oil Resources in the search of oil, Department of Social Science Education Delta State University, Abraka. The resultant effect of the exploiting activities of these multinationals in the region is multiple environmental disorders, devastation of the ecosystem and most importantly deprivation through gas flaring and spillage, these coupled with non-sustainable resources and unjust federal fiscal policy which favors non-oil producing ethnic majorities. On the basis of equalities of the state and population in reaction to this, a counter force to the states action, youth movement emerged to confront the governments and the multinational companies. Notable among the youth movement are Movement for the survival of Ogoni people (MOSOP), Movement for the survival of Ijaw ethnic nationality in the Niger-Delta, Movement in preparations of Ogbia Ogbesu youths. These youth organizations in Delta State embarked on series of protest and demand against environmental degradation and total neglect thereby causing insecurity. They demanded for accelerated development of their area from oil generated revenue accrued to them; and accusing the government of economic disempowerment and handling of environmental consequences of oil exploration with levity hence they sorted to violence. 

Some of such violence activities include kidnapping and the armed insurrection against the Nigerian State was formally launched. After the 1998 Kiama Declaration, comprising mainly of ethnic militias of which over 70% are of the Ijaw ethnic origin, the youths accused the state of systematic looting of their God-given resources and marginalization (Onoyume 2007). The youths have therefore militarized the struggle to develop their backward environment and to secure greater control of oil revenue derived from the region, this led to the establishment of armed groups operating under such names as Egbesu boys, Meinbutu, Arobgo Freedom Fighters, Joint revolutionary council and most especially the dreaded Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger- Delta (MEND) and the activities of this militant groups have serious implications to peace and security in the region. Based on this oil exploitation, national revenue profit and other derivatives the country is facing numerous threats such as blowing up of oil wells, kidnapping of expatriates and oil workers thereby causing political instability and insecurity, most times the insecurity and crisis in  in Niger Delta region is alarming. Youth restiveness is a phenomenon that has attracted both national and international attention in recent time. 

Against this background, successive government and civilian alike have battled with Niger- Delta crisis with the accompanied monumental loss of human and material resources, and yet lasting solutions seems intangible. Youth restiveness and security in all its ramifications possess a serious challenge to the nation. Consequently, every successive government had introduced one measure or the other to curb, control, minimize and manage youth unrest in the Niger- Delta and the latest measure taken by Yar'Adua/ Jonathan civilian government to curb the menace was the introduction of “Amnesty” programme where ex-militants and armed youths who have lived as fugitives in their country of birth are encouraged to lay down their illegally acquired arms and ammunitions to get rehabilitated and reabsorbed in to the Nigerian society as free born citizens. 

Once again it is obvious that the refusal of the Nigeria state to respond positively to the pens and placards of the Harold Dappapriye and the Saro- Wiwas’ era has created an environment of anger and desperation, more so, the dialogue option has equally failed because the Nigerian state have refused to adequately implement numerous blue prints for development in the region. Nigeria is the jewel in the African oil crown, but oil, militancy and insecurity in Delta and in general the Niger - Delta has become a subject of discussion just like the British weather, whereas the oil produced in the Niger-Delta is the life blood of the Nigerian economy. Oil has failed to translate to national prosperity development in the Niger- Delta. The region has become a hot bed of crisis because the problem of neglect and marginalization has been pushing the people to resist deprivations, intimidation and domination, hegemony politics and injustice. From the dialects of violent agitations (militancy) in Delta state, the Niger- Delta, two arguments appears a discernable one, that violent oil agitation is as a result of the Nigerian government application of force in unveiling non-violent agitation protests of Niger- Delta against the state of gross under-development of that area that arose from the neglect of both federal government and multinational oil companies operating in the area. 

We must reiterate the fact that the tremendous amount of oil revenue derived from the Niger- Delta costs the people their farmlands, fishing rivers and a host of other health hazards (like acid rain) due to the enormous environmental degradation caused by oil production activities of petrol business. Reference are usually made to government’s violent actions such as the incarceration and execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other activists of 1995, the Aloibiri Demonstration crisis 1997, the Kiama Declaration crisis of 1998, the Opia/Ikiyan invasion of 1999, the deployment of naval war ships to Warri by the federal government to quall the Ijaw- Itshekiri crisis over the revocation of Warri-south local government council headquarters from Ogbe-Ijoh and Ijaw town to Ogidegben an Itsekiri town, the arrest and detention of Asari Dokubo, Diepreye Alamieseigha, Henry Okah, etc (Oweila 2009). The second state of argument asserts that militancy in the Niger- Delta and Delta state in form of hostage taking, kidnapping, pipeline vandalism, hijacking etc is a result of frustration due to lack of education, poverty, unemployment, idleness of the youths in the region, therefore contends that militants are not fighting for socio-economic and political emancipation of the region but simply to enrich themselves (Ibeanu 2000, Koroye 2007, Akanfa 2007, Igini 2008n Bariagh Amange 2009). The fundamental question that begs for answers is one which sides of the argument ' does the truth lie?’

CAUSAL ANALYSIS OF NIGER DELTA CONFLICT

We shall be considering four major factors as the causes of Niger Delta conflict.

Political Factors

From pre-independence, members of the Ibo and Yoruba ethnic group have dominated the people of the Niger Delta. By virtue of their population, the ethnic nationalities of the Niger Delta became a minority in relation to the two dominant ethnic groups in the two regions (Naanen, 1995; Obi, 1997). Since regional politics was basically primordial and often defined in terms of ethnicity, competitive communalism flourished, with the consequence that the Niger Delta minority ethnic groups suffered neglect under the rule of the two major ethnic groups. They lacked basic socio-economic and developmental infrastructure that could be considered to be at par with that in other parts of the region. For example, the Ogonis were so embittered that the chiefs complained to the Governor of Nigeria during his visit to the Eastern Region in 1956, that they were being denied access to scholarships, jobs, important positions, and other socio-economic opportunities. Naanen (1995) described this scenario as a case of 'internal colonialism'. Similarly, minority status within these regions meant the people of the region suffered political exclusion. It is on this basis that one can fathom why at independence, they clamored for a region of their own, out of fear of further political marginalization and socio-economic exclusion. This agitation lead only to the setting up of the Wilkin Commission in 1958, which conducted a study and reached the conclusion that the region was poor, backward, neglected and a harsh terrain to live.

Ethnic politics at the national level also gave little or no room for issues concerning the people of the Niger Delta to be addressed. Rather, such issues were relegated to the background of the national agenda or at best recommendations were made but never implemented. The politics that shrouded the setting up of the Niger Delta Development Board in 1960, and its eventual demise in 1966, attest to the disdain treatment of issues concerning minorities at national level in Nigeria.

With growing frustration, bitterness and a widespread sense of powerlessness, public protest became a viable means for the people of the Niger Delta to vent their grievances. Unfortunately, such expressions of grievances were not only worsening the legitimacy crisis of the military government, but also became a threat to their personal wealth accumulation schemes. 

The Nigerian-petrol-state saw the stakes in such agitations as too high for any kind of retreat, because it would totally erode the basis of its rule, legitimacy and continue production (Obi, 2001). Hence, due to its militaristic tendencies, the state continually used the armed forces to snuff out opposition that effectively ensured the militarization of the Niger Delta region and fuelled the breakdown of state society-relationship (Frynas, 2001).  The predominance of military rule in Nigeria was therefore one singular political factor that drove the people of the Delta to express their grievance through violence. The inability of the Nigerian state to maintain internal order with minimum use of force, and its inability to meet its social responsibility to the people has been said to be one of the root causes of this conflict.

Economic Factors

Economic factors engendering the conflict can be thought of in terms of two nexuses (i.e. political-economic and the economic-environment). The political-economic nexus to the conflict in principle rests squarely on oil revenue allocation, which directly heightened the sense of relative deprivation among the people of the Niger Delta. For example, Obi (1997; Obi 1999) and lbeanu (2000) affirmed that the bulk of the oil revenues generated from the region should be returned back to the region on the basis of fairness, compensation and self-determination is at the heart of the Niger Delta struggle. Other politico-economic factors include the renter status of Nigeria (Yates 1996) as well as the national economic crisis of the 1980s. As far as this write up is concern the reinter-predatory status of the Nigerian state contributed to the conflict in the Niger Delta in two main ways.

First, the reinter status, with the associated effect of 'Dutch disease', allowed the various state and local governments in Nigeria to become heavily dependent on the federal government for economic sustenance. Khan (1994) made allusion to this, when he stated that the state governments abandoned any pretense of a productive identity and relied unashamedly on federal government handouts. Given that competitive communalism had already taken a strong hold on Nigeria politics, issues of oil revenue allocation became a hotly contested terrain. Oil revenue was effectively a 'relatively accessed goods' such that the amount that accrues to any actor depends on the amount that accrues to its competitor. 

The relative accessed nature of oil revenue, among the tiers of government made increases in access to oil wealth for the people of the Niger Delta extremely difficult, which within the context of marginalization, gave room for the development of a 'worse off' feeling among the Niger Deltas, in relation to other major ethnic groups in Nigeria. The abnegation of the principle of derivation meant that the five southern oil-producing states that accounted for 90 per cent of oil revenue received 19.3 per cent of allocated revenue, and the five northern non-oil producing states conversely received 26 per cent of the allocated federal revenue (Ikporukpo, 1996). Despite its vast oil resources, the Niger Delta region still remains poor, with its GNP per capita and educational levels below national average, and 70 per cent of its people living below the poverty line (NDDC 2004). 

The second contribution of the predatory-reinter status of the Nigerian state arises from its inability to perform its traditional role of mediating conflicting and competing interest among the various strata of society as an unbiased umpire. Olojede et al. (2000) noted that since the Nigerian state is enmeshed in the crisis of accumulation, it could not extricate itself from social antagonism because the state, by implication, cannot be an impartial arbiter as it is a direct stockholder. In turn, this undermined the credibility of the Nigerian state within the polity of the Niger Delta. In the Niger Delta, Nigeria is seen as a privatized entity that has been parceled out as a means of production serving ethnic, personal and other interest at the expense of the people of the region (Obi, 1997).

The above perception is underpinned by the fact that for over 40 years, oil wealth has brought nothing to the people of Niger Delta, except ecological catastrophe, social deprivation, political marginalization, and a rapacious company capitalism in which unaccountable foreign oil companies are seen to be granted a sort of state immunity (Watts, 1998). Given the perception by the people of the Nigerian state as biased against their interest, the chances of the state being able to manage internal contradiction without recourse to force were significantly diminished. 

The economic-environmental nexus to the conflict relates to the role of poverty, the geography of oil and the economic impact of environmental degradation on host communities. Watts (1998) noted that insofar as oil is state property, then the relationship of oil producers (and citizens in general) with the state becomes an object of debate. In other words, oil as a subterranean and territorial resource that is highly centralized and a property of the state necessarily channels claims over nature ('our oil') into a sort of right talk. As Obi (2001) points out, the location of oil in the region of the ethnic minority gave the people leverage provided by 'economic power' to adopt an oil-owning identity and claim special rights. Hence, 'oil' minority rights reversed the perceived political and economic insignificance of the Niger Delta people by increasing the bargaining power of the people vis-a-vis the state. This sense of ownership of oil strengthened the peoples' resolve and provided the impetus for the people to demand political inclusion and for the state to meets its social responsibility to them.

Environmental Factors

 The relationship between the environment and political conflict has been a subject of debate since the dawn of history. However, in recent years consensus began to emerge that environmental factor cannot by themselves alone be the cause of conflict. Hence, the role of environmental factors in the Niger Delta conflict can only be understood in terms of being a proximate cause. Besides, given the dynamics of the conflict, it is difficult to see how environmental factors could contribute to conflict without interacting with pre-existing conflict generating factors. After all, political and economic factors are partly responsible for environmental degradation within the Niger Delta. 

The people of the Niger Delta are predominantly engaged in farming and fishing for their livelihood sustenance. Although there is scant empirical data on changes in agricultural production and land use due to environmental change, anecdotal evidence suggests such changes have occurred. According to Moffat and Linden (1995), issues of seasonal flooding and erosion have also been known to cause the loss of scarce arable lands. Available evidence also suggests that the fish stocks in the Niger Delta are being depleted from overuse. It also suggests that official catch figures exceeded the maximum sustainable yield for at least twelve of the last fourteen years, and this was attributed to over fishing. There is no doubt that the impacts of oil spills have been devastating in environmental and, therefore, economic terms for community members. According to Okoh (1996) and Olojede et al. (2000), oil spills jeopardize the occupation and means of livelihood of community members, and indirectly fuel competition for scarce arable land among community members.

Oil companies are known to acquire scarce arable lands for the construction of oil facilities or the laying of pipelines. Such land use often brings with it issues of compensation claims that very often lead to corporate-community conflict. Ibeanu (2000) argued that while the government and oil companies often portray communities as greedy, corrupt and unpatriotic as regards issues of compensation, such statements are simplistic and reductionist, in the sense that they mask the key issues at stake, and reveal very little about the relationship between the various stakeholders in the Nigerian oil industry. He argued that conflict over compensation is very often either about the type and amount, the procedures for making such payments, or the skewed nature of how compensation is distributed. These issues pertaining to environmental degradation arose partly as a result of government failure to effectively regulate the oil industry and its externalities, as well as due to the pursuit of self-serving cost cutting policies by the oil companies.

The environment-political nexus to the conflict therefore hinges on the poor performance of government, and the social irresponsibility of oil companies in the Niger Delta.

The consequence was that widespread environmental problems in the region became a useful variable that the elites could use to mobilize the youth and gain grassroots support for their confrontation with the Nigerian state. Since everyone felt the impact of environmental degradation, environmental factors made it possible for the cost of violence to be distributed widely, therefore making the cost of inaction seem to outweigh the cost of any violent action. Environmental factors thus widen the opportunity structure for collective violence, and made the prevailing condition unacceptable.

  Social Factors

The contribution of social factors to the conflict in the Niger Delta includes proliferation of the sense of relative deprivation, mass youth unemployment, and increased awareness that oil is a finite resource. Since independence, the number of educated people in Nigeria's rural communities has been on a steady increase (lbeanu, 2000; Ukeje, 2001), with an associated increase in awareness of the sense of relative deprivation. More people in the Niger Delta now realize that they were, and are, living in worse conditions than people from the majority ethnic groups (i.e. Yoruba, Hausa) in other parts of Nigeria, partially due to oil production in the Niger Delta. 

When elders and youth from the Niger Delta region travelled to big cities like Lagos and Abuja in search of jobs and a better life, they often brought back news and stories that the people were living in conditions not comparable with what is obtainable at home. lbeanu (2002) asserted that political rallies such as the one organized by Abacha in 1998 graphically showed participating unemployed youth from the Niger Delta, the stark contrast between opulence in cities like Abuja, funded by oil revenue, and pervasive squalor in their home communities. This spawned a deep sense of relative deprivation, frustration, and a feeling of rejection that are expressed at the slightest opportunity through violence.

The realization by the communities that oil was a finite resource given the experience from Oloibori where oil was first explored also brought a sense of urgency to act. According to Okoh (1996), the inhabitants of Oloibiri whose town was once a major hub of oil production now live a solitary and depressed life. Electricity, good roads and pipe-borne water are non-existent in Oloibiri. Two things remind the people that oil was drilled from their soil. The first is the presence of abandoned pipes and oil exploration equipment at the numerous sites that served as oil wells and flow stations. The second legacy is the infertility of their land. This situation has led many people in the Niger Delta to ask the question: what will be the fate of their community when oil wells finally dry up? (Okoh, 1996). Obviously, the answer to this question is not farfetched, as most people believe that history is bound to repeat itself. Hence, the Niger Delta people increasingly became less willing to sit it out and instead opt to take their future into their hands, making confrontation with the Nigerian state and the oil companies an inevitable outcome.

CONTEXT ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT IN THE NIGER DELTA OF NIGERIA

Overview of the Niger Delta Region

The Niger Delta region is situated in the Southern part of Nigeria and bordered to the south by the Atlantic Ocean and to the East by Cameroon. It occupies 7.5% of the total land mass of Nigeria (about 70,000 square km2) and inhabits some 31 million people  from over 40 ethnic groups including Bini, Efik, Esan, Ibibio, Igbo, Annang, Oron, Ijaw, Itsekiri, Yoruba, Isoko, Urhobo, Ukwuani, Kalabari and Ogoni.  As in other major deltas in the world such as the Amazon in Brazil and the Mekong in Vietnam, the Nigerian Niger Delta region is a wetland and consists of creeks, estuaries and intricate marshlands. Deltas are regions of coastal terrain and river landforms; a rainforest or area surrounded by water and have special vegetation. Until the 1956 discovery of crude oil, the region was historically known as a major producer of palm oil and rubber and the inhabitants depend mainly on fishery and farming. 

The present day Niger Delta comprises of nine states from the South South and South East geo political zones of Nigeria. The core natural delta of Nigeria however, consists of areas covering parts of the present day six states namely Bayelsa, Cross Rivers, Edo, Akwa Ibom, Rivers and Delta. In 2000 following the establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) a federal government agency mandated to facilitate the “rapid, even and sustainable development of the Niger Delta” the region was extended to nine states and officially defined to include all oil producing states and others considered relevant for reasons of administrative convenience, political expediency and development objectives. Consequently, Abia, Imo and Ondo States were added to the Niger Delta Region.

Context of the Conflict

Oil as a natural endowment in a particular community, area or region, with its exploration and exploitation is expected to be an abundant blessing to such community, area or region. Unfortunately and regrettably too, oil has turned out to be a curse to the Niger-Delta Region of Nigeria since 1956 when it was first discovered in the region.  Environmental degradation, destruction of aquatic lives, deforestation, water pollution and poor waste management have become the ecological characteristic of the Niger Delta due to oil exploration and exploitation, making the region uninhabitable. More bewildering is the paradox of producing the abundant natural resources that sustains the country’s economy and yet having to live in extreme neglect. 

In 1950, as Nigeria began to prepare for independence, the search for oil began in the Delta and by 1956 it was discovered in commercial quantities in a small village called Oloibiri in present day Bayelsa. Less than two years later it was discovered in larger quantities in Ogoni leading to the commercial production and sales of oil on the international markets. The Oloibiri oilfields were quickly extracted and they were dried off. Nothing of tangible nature was put back in the place to indicate petrodollars were carted away by the Federal Government and Shell Oil. What could be said to be the only significance was a fenced land meant for the development of an oil museum. The Ogoni and all other communities where oil was found had the same fate.

The multi-national oil companies (MNOCs) recklessly explored and exploit crude oil leaving behind massive oil spills and uncontrolled gas flaring that result in water pollution, deforestation and other environmental hazards. 

This endemic poverty in the midst of affluence and lack of democratization in the distribution of the revenues from the oil-producing states led to the numerous uprisings and insurgency witnessed in the region. Starting from the 1966 revolution and declaration of independence of the Niger Delta’s People’s Republic by the Isaac Adaka Boro led Niger Delta Volunteers Force against the massive expropriation, deprivation, squalor and neglect meted out on the people from where crude oil is being produced;  to the 1990 Ken Saro Wiwa agitation for compensation for environmental damage caused by oil drilling up till the 1999 formation of the armed resistance group, the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), the conflict in the Niger Delta has been all about resource control, economic marginalization and environmental degradation.

As a result of the products from crude oil existing in the area the Niger Delta is Nigeria’s richest region; which makes Nigeria the largest petroleum producer in Africa and the sixth in the world. Resources (oil and gas) from the region are the main sources of revenue in Nigeria. Since the early 1990’s petroleum production have accounted for more than 25% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), oil exports have accounted for over 95% of its total export earnings and about 75% of government revenue.  However, this region remains one of the least developed parts of the country the region lack basic social amenities such as pipe-borne water, electricity, quality education and health care facilities.  

The untold hardship and sufferings meted out to the entire Ogoni ethnic nationality in the 1990s culminated in the execution of the amiable minority rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and other eight Ogoni kinsmen, and the invasion and destruction of innocent lives and property in communities such as Odi, Odioma, Ayakoroma, Gbaramatu kingdom, Oporoza just to mention but a few by government forces. Therefore, it is not surprising that the consciousness of exploitation, marginalization and disempowerment has made the Niger Delta a region of deep rooted frustration, hence the escalating oil agitations in the region wrapped in militancy. 

Access to crude oil revenue, environmental degradation and economic mismanagement are the major trigger of conflict in the Niger Delta Region. Nigeria depends heavily on the commodity for export proceeds and government revenue, and as such, the economy is very vulnerable to oil price swings.  A trend which has not only crippled efforts at developmental reform, but has also resulted in social, economic, and political stagnation.

The Niger Delta has remained the treasure based of Nigeria state in the past three decades. The area harbors over 90 percent of Nigeria’s crude oil and gas resources, which accounts for 90 percent of the country’s foreign exchange earnings. As at 2003, Nigeria’s crude oil reserves in the Niger Delta stood at 33 billion barrels, while the natural gas reserve was 160 trillion cu. Ft (Onuoha, 2(04). The Niger Delta region is therefore a place of intense exploration and exploitation of crude oil and gas. The consequence has been the massive environmental degradation of the area. The minority status of the autochthonous people of the area has leg to their political and economic marginalization in the larger Nigerian federation. This has bred in them a feeling of utter neglect, relegation and discrimination. For them, it is a pathetic case of living by riverside and washing hands with spittle.

STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS IN THE NIGER DELTA      

The concept of violence or crisis in the Niger delta region has attracted academic scholarship in international politics. In the third world countries, the causes of conflict are usually associated to leadership failure and revenue allocation. The Niger delta area/region which comprise of six major states in the south-south geo-political zone in the country (Rivers, Bayelsa, Edo, Delta, Cross Rivers and Akwa Ibom). It could also be stated that the region extended to some areas geographically because of the deposited of oil well such as Ondo state, Imo state.

The Niger delta militancy that gave birth to the kidnapping / pipeline vandalisation in the Niger Delta region that assumed its ugly face during late president Musa Yar’adua administration has raised a lot of security threat to the country/nation economy. The crisis has done serious damage to the safety of ordinary Nigerians as well as socio-economic and political development of the nation as a whole. The Niger Delta crisis according to security experts and academia in the various field of learning has attributed or heard their view that the divided menace could be able to thrive I that region because of the various role played by the stakeholders in the region and country at large.

It is very pertinent to know that conflict resulted into crisis stage due to the activities of the various stakeholders in the crisis; therefore, the Niger Delta which has poised serious security challenges to the country’s economy can be devoid of the stakeholders’ roles in the crises. This would make us to briefly discuss the role of stakeholders in the Niger Delta crisis in Nigeria.

Stakeholders in a conflict are the parties to conflict. Parties are individuals who are involve and participate to the conflict either directly or indirectly based on the feelings that they have interest to pursue, something at stake or because they believe that their interests and needs are being threatened in one way or the other.

 According to a renowned scholar in the field of peace and conflict studies, Professor Isaac Olawale Albert, he identified three types of stakeholders in conflict in one of his lectures which are

Primary stakeholders- these are considered to be the most visible parties in a conflict. They are the main actor in the conflict.

Secondary stakeholders- these are the individuals or groups that have relationship with the primary parties in a conflict. They play a very active role in the progression of the conflict.

The shadow stakeholder- these are indirect parties who are not visible in the conflict. The involvement is usually by proxy rather than directly, and from a distance. They complicate conflict situation mostly because it is difficult to identify them and their roles in any given conflict. In any social conflict, there are shadow parties.

 Having briefly discussed the various kinds of stakeholders above, it would be necessary to look  into how various stakeholders played a vital and tremendous  roles and in the Niger delta crises and providing ways in which the crises in the region was address and the region up to this moment was able to enjoy relative peace.

The Niger Delta crises which could be traced to the failure of the government of the country to provide basic infrastructural development to the region and addressing the rate of unemployment among the youth in the region made the region to be a volatile region in the country and it had adverse effect on the country economy. The region which is the economy based of the country in terms of national treasury had been neglected for so many years by government of the day. The people of the region were also being marginalized in the game of political offices and various sectors of the country. These factors made the youths in the region to wage war against the state in demanding for justice and equality in terms of development of their region. Although, the struggle was later hijacked by the so called sycophants in the region for their own selfish motives, efforts were still made by the government to manage the crisis.

The primary parties in the Niger Delta crises and majorly the youth who formed different bodies such as Niger Delta volunteer forces led by Alhaji Asari Dokubo, NASOP etc. they are fighting against the relative depravation of their region which served as the economic hub of the nation’s treasury by the government. They involved in various heinous activities against the state such as kidnapping both bigwigs in the oil sectors and the foreigners who are as collaborators with the government of marginalizing their region for their selfish interest. They also involve in pipeline vandalisation and other disastrous activities which chase foreign investors away from the region and has adverse effect on the country image both within and the world at large. 

The activities of this primary stakeholder reach raise its ugly situation during the tenure of late president Musa Yar’adua in which there was high rate of kidnapping; perpetual vandalisation and the country faced a serious dropped in the income earnings from crude oil. There were confrontations from the part of the government in putting the crises at bay. Also, individuals, groups and entities whose activities in the region have constituted social imbalance and deration of the environment were not silent during the outbreak. Instead of the government’s confrontation to put the Niger Delta militants into check, the reverse was the case. What we had then was conflict escalation rather than conflict de-escalation.

Also, it could be said that the conflict generated into serious crises through the activities of the secondary duperies which have been stated earlier in the course of this write-up. The primary stakeholders in the Niger Delta crises could not be able to achieve their main goals of alleviating the suffering of their own region from oppression, degradation, marginalization without the tremendous support of their friends, associate, families who see their course as a just war.

While the part of the shadow stakeholders in the Niger Delta crises have shown that there is no conflict that occurred without the involvement of the fuelling forces which are known as “shadow parties”. According to former military head of state in this country, late Sanni Abacha (1993-1998), he said in one of his public addresses that “if terrorism persist for more than 24hrs, that shows the government in power is involve in it” this statement which was started by late General Sanni Abacha was an indication that all social conflict in the nation, shadow parties played vital roles in promoting the high rate of the crises. The Niger Delta militants according to various media reporters that, they have accessed to sophisticated weapons and ammunition even more than the Nigeria soldiers. How do they have funds and resources to acquire such arms and ammunitions? This is a debating issue to be addressed by the government in power.    

ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE NIGER DELTA CRISIS

the crisis has made illegal bunkering of oil to thrive, which is also the source of funds for the militants operating in creeks losses 70,000 to 300,000 barrels per day to illegal bunkering, the equivalent output of a small oil producing country in its annual report in late August 2006, Shell Nigeria estimated illegal bunkering losses at 20,000 to 40,000 barrels per day in 2005, down from 40,000 to 60,000 in 2004. The Washington based council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force calculated that a loss of just 70,00 barrels a day at a price of $60 a barrel “would generates over $1.5 billion per year that will increase resources to fund arms trafficking, by political influence or both”.

Downsize of Companies Employees: The crisis in the Niger Delta is hampering operations of the oil companies; in fact, some of them have started to lay off their workers. Other remaining oil companies that are still around may not have sufficient employees if the crisis is not handled carefully. A similar action was taken in 2004 when about 1,500 shell workers were retrenched. The idea was conceived in order to reduce operational costs, in view of the worsening security situation in the Niger Delta region.

 Dearth in business activities: Since the crisis started particularly hostage taking and attacks on oil installations in the Niger Delta, there has been dearth in business activities. Restiveness has reduced growth in the business sector. In Rivers state alone, the situation may assume a Worrisome dimension to the extent that, about 80 percent of companies in the state have stop operations as expatriates has either gone to their countries, such situations often times results to employment ratio among the youth. The Niger Delta Crisis has serious economic impact as it disrupts telecommunication activities. The crisis has negative impact for the telecommunication sector, militant activities has compounded the problems of drop calls in the networks of mobile operator in the country as several base stations have become inaccessible in the region, confirming this point, the General Manager, Regulatory Affairs of Mobile Telecommunication Network (MTN) Nigeria, Mr. Wale Goodluck said “the company had 43 base station shut down in the Niger Delta region due to militant activities that made them inaccessible.

Losses to the region: This is another economic impact of the Niger Delta Crisis, besides the trillions of naira that have been lost by the country due to the crisis the Niger Delta, states are sufferings as a result of the lingering problem. All the states in the region have been failing their’ oil production quota and that means lower 13 percent derivation funds. One of the governors cried out that it was as if his state was no longer oil producing.

IMPACT OF THE NIGER DELTA CRISIS ON NIGERIA’S IMAGE INTERNATIONALLY

Internationally, the image problem occasioned by the Niger Delta region of Nigeria has adversely affected the inflow of foreign investment into Nigeria. Moreover, the crisis has led to a renewed campaign of calumny against Nigeria with many western Nations issuing travel advisory to their nationals not to travel to Nigeria because of bad security situation and the militants in the country.

Significantly, Nigeria could lose its seat in a number of sensitive international organizations. Already, drama has played out in the International Marine Organization (IMO). The body had issued a warning to Nigeria that if safety of the territorial waters continue to be threatened by the crisis, no foreign vessels will be allowed to come to the country to lift crude oil or gas..

More so, as a major player in Africa affairs, the perceptions of negative image with Nigeria have been making some countries in Africa to contest the leadership position with the country.

Furthermore, international moral and economic support, and foreign aids could be reduced to or withheld by donor agencies, international organizations and foreign countries due to bad governance, corruption, disregard for the rule of law etc. 

Added to the above, the crisis in the region has continued to attract international attention, especially environmental activists, like Amnesty International, Human Right Watch, Friends of Earth etc., they have carried out advocacy programmes and have written several damaging reports on the activities of the Nigeria state, the resultant barrage of criticisms and sanctions reduced Nigeria to a pariah state.

The Niger delta crisis can be rightly tagged as one, characterised by different interest fronts with each holding one thing or the other against the Nigerian Government. Perhaps the feeling of "internal colonialism" by others which the indigenes of Niger delta have, this brought them to a position of violence, resulting to violent actions against the government, where militancy and rebellious activities became the order of the day. 

The government met these actions of the Niger delta people with stiff confrontational responses; a pure military approach was used. First, the ijaw youth killed 12 policemen as a response to the military men suppressing their uprising. They killing the policemen, the military went to where this occurred, a town called Odi and what was perpetrated there is what is today notoriously called the Odi massacre. The violent repressive approach of the Nigerian Government helped in winning sine form of legitimacy for the militant groups in the region who were viewed as fighting for self-preservation in the face of proximate potential extinction occasioned by the ecological war of the oil companies and now the repressive and violent approach of their own government whose primary responsibility is protection of the rights of the people.

The Joint task force was set up and the Niger delta area became a war Zone as it was characterised by violent resistance by the militants and their battle to suppress them by the Nigerian military. This confrontational approach cost the country so much as it became difficult for the country to explore or exploit oil in the region. Consequently, the 2.5million Barrels per day dropped by about half of that making Angola which was the second highest oil producing country in Africa to become the first. This reality if the consequences of the drop in oil and it's implication on the economy changed the conflict handling style of the government

On the 24th of June 2009, the President of Nigeria late Ya’radua announced an amnesty policy. The president said

"I hereby grant amnesty and unconditional pardon to ask who have directly or indirectly participated in the commission of offences associated with militant activities in the Niger delta".

The policy maintained that militants who lay down their arms within 60days won't be prosecuted for the crimes committed. The policy also explained that the amnesty programme transcends their being demobilised or disarmed but introduced plans for rehabilitation and reintegration. This was a change of strategy from the violent approach and confrontational stance to one of non-violent approach with the room for joint problem solving. Dialogues became imminent and militants began to trooping out in great numbers to accept the deal. The principles of recovery were applied in the new policy of the amnesty initiative. There was a demobilisation and disarmament process and then their rehabilitation which the government took care of by camping them, paying them stipends, sending them on trainings both within and outside the country and vocational training and teaching. 

As it is no news that there can never be total recovery in a post conflict situation, neither can there be total reconciliation, especially in this case when the government has not gone deep to address the root cause of the Niger delta crisis i.e., their land and ecological degradation resulting to the loss of livelihood for a community predominantly living on fishing and farming. The government set up these initiatives to end just the immediate conflict. Though the amnesty policy brought relative peace to the Niger delta region, total peace in this region has not been achievable.   

GOVERNMENT ROLE IN NIGER DELTA CRISIS - RIVERS STATE AND THE VARIOUS COMMISSION/BOARD CHARGED WITH HUMAN AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE NIGER DELTA

	Commission/ Board	Life span	Specific function	Specific problem(s)	Impact on rural Rivers State
1	Niger Delta Development Board (off shoot of Henry Willinks Report 1958)	1961-67	To manage the developmental problems and needs of the people of the region.	Lack of direction and focus. Its activities were interrupted by the civil war	No meaningful infrastructural development was recorded in the area
2	Niger Delta Basin Development Authority (NDBDA)	1976-79	To produce hydroelectric power, flood control and the regulation of the flow of rivers for navigational and recreational facilities to promote socio-economic activities in the region.	Poor funding, only N76.7m was released as against N650.7m released for Sokoto – Rima Basin Development Authority	Its impact was not felt in rural Rivers State in terms of infrastructural development to improve the area
3	Presidential Task Force, Received 1-3% Federation Account	1980-92	To manage the developmental challenges of the region and improve their economy	Lack of effective planning and poor funding	70% of projects remarked for rural Rivers State were not executed
4	Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission	1992-99	To manage ecological problems and develop oil producing community.	Lack of data for planning and excessive political interference	30% of project awarded in rural Rivers State were not executed, 35% were uncompleted.
5	Niger Delta Development Commission	2000-date	To find out a lasting solution to the problems of underdevelopment in the region. To facilitate rapid and sustainable development of the region.	The commission scope of operation is too broad. Too much political interference, inadequate funding and recurrent militia insurgency	It has not had any significant impact on rural Rivers State. Out of the 1252 projects assigned to Rivers State only 30% have been completed. Ineffective monitoring and militancy crises had resulted into several uncompleted projects

Source: Authors compilation from Field work and Ademola, 2008

Militant Approach

The reality of contributing to the oil that oils the economy of the country yet looking helpless in the face of ramifying impoverishment was too much for the youths of the area to bear. Being conscious of the fact that the peaceful or non-violent means adopted by their political leaders yielded little result, the youths excitedly took up arms to protest against the oil companies and the Nigerian State in respect of the marginalization and developmental deficit associated with the area. The strategy adopted was a massive attack on oil installations and taking of oil workers as hostages. The Oil market in the country became very jittery. In early 2005, political representatives from the oil producing region walked out of a national conference on matters relating to the distribution of oil revenue. Few months later the Obasanjo government arrested a Niger Delta militant on charges of treason. 

This action escalated the violence across oil field in the region resulting into several humanitarian and economic tragedies. Between 1998 and 2003, there were four hundred incidents of vandalized oil company facilities yearly across the Niger Delta. This number increased to 581 between January and September 2004. The emergence of two ethnic militias from Rivers State led by Ateke Tom (Niger Delta Vigilante) and Alhaji Asari Dokubo of the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force heightened the war against the oil companies and the Nigerian State. Both men angered by the marginalization, economic as well as developmental backwardness of their people asked both the Nigerian State and oil companies to leave their oil and land alone. 

This provoked President Obasanjo who ordered for the militarization of the state to stop ethnic militia and to protect the business of oil exploration. The action of the president rather than quelling the storm angered the people. It was therefore not surprising the emergence of more ethnic militia after the president’s declaration of Rivers State as one of the volatile breeding ground for militant groups that must be crushed. 

Three things worked against the Federal Police of President Obasanjo from recording success against the militants; (1) the geography of the state, an army of creeks and swamps, and the absence of effective transportation and communication infrastructure denied the president’s policemen access to the interior of the state. (2) The ethnic militia were already reaping enormous wealth from the business of oil bunkering and were therefore able to raise the needed resources to oil their machinery of warfare against President Obasanjo’s policemen. (3) Some of the president’s policemen commissioned to crush the ethnic militia could not resist the carrot coming from the business of oil bunkering. With poor condition of service in the profession, some of them saw it as an avenue to fight their ways out of poverty. A romance with the ethnic militia therefore was inevitable. These militant groups operated outside the control of traditional governance institutions, and soon grew into a strong voice requesting for total control of the God given resources at their backyard. With arms in hand and easy access to crude from pipelines and flow stations, the youths discovered a new avenue to fight their ways out of poverty.

Rural Development in the Face of Militancy Crisis

The level of sophistication in brutality and violence practiced by the ethnic militia soon made them the “bride” of the political class in the state who see politics as a form of war; those not willing to respect electoral principles guiding party politics. These ethnic militants became ready-made tools in the hand of politicians to suppress their political opponents and establish their dominance in their respective locality. Before the end of the first tenure of Dr. Peter Odili, the drum for his second term aspiration was very high in the state but his popularity had diminished.

 Those beating the drum for him in the ruling PDP knew very well it was not going to come through the ballot box. The profile of those opposed to the second term agenda led by Dr. Marshall Harry was steadily rising daily in the state and the hand writing was very clear to Odili and his men. Murder, intimidation, arson, kidnapping, bribery, etc became the readily available tools to fight those opposed to the governor’s second term agenda. The Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force led by Mujahid Dokubo Asari was one of the several groups that were intensely patronized by the governor and his men to help him in his second term ambition. The strategy paid off and the governor returned to the Brick house for his second missionary journey. Soon after the election, Asari’s criticism of President Obasanjo policies towards the Niger Delta pitched him against Odili. Asari’s romance with the “Brick House” came to an end. On September 27, 2004 he formally declared a war against the Nigerian government. 

The government response was to chase Asari and his boys into the creek while a new romance with a rival group, the Niger Delta Vigilante led by Ateke Tom was activated. This singular act on the part of the government was the beginning of new era of hostility between the two groups in the state. While Ateke had the support of “Brick House”, Asari was backed up by those within and outside the state opposed to the governor’s style of leadership. The financial prowess of both men made them very popular among other militant and youth groups in the state and it was therefore not very long when the militant groups in the state were divided between these two powerful militant groups. 

The entire geography of the state soon became under the sway of these two militant groups. Soon it was clear to point out which group controls which geographical area in the state. In some geographical areas, the words of these militant groups became law. Traditional institutions not having the support of the political godfathers of these militants were either sacked or driven into self-exile. With sophisticated weapons and an act of brutality, these boys succeeded in building an atmosphere of fear in the state especially in the rural areas. It was reported that on August 15, 2004, “several armed local militia men mainly of Ataba extraction in collaboration with recruited mercenaries from neighbouring communities, launched an aggressive attack on Ataba, a remote riverine community in Andoni Local Council of Rivers State. The resultant killings and wanton destruction of properties indicated that their mission was primarily to annihilate or drive out from the community persons perceived to be opposed to one of the persons involved in a local chieftaincy dispute. In the process, over sixty persons were gruesomely murdered in cold blood, many houses were razed and reduced to rubbles, and properties worth millions of naira were destroyed. Those who survived the attack were maimed and several of them sent on self-exile”. The picture of violence recorded in Ataba was not different from what was reported in the other local councils in the state especially in the riverine communities. There were frequent cases of attack and counter-attack by the two powerful militant groups to establish dominance. In Buguma, in the Asari Toru Council, those opposed to the installation of Professor Princewill as the king of the Kalabari people got the services of the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) and attacked the King’s palace. 

The king was able to escape but his personal secretary, Prince Adolphus Amachree was not that lucky; he was abducted and beheaded. He was not the only casualty; two mobile police officers attached to the residence of the king also lost their lives. In addition, properties of those believed to be in the king’s camp were either burnt or destroyed. After the attack, the Niger Delta Vigilante became the police of the town. The Rivers State government was accused of masterminding the attack because of the involvement of some key powerful officers in the Odili cabinet from the area in the tussle for political leadership, though the government denied involvement. Asari however regarded the policing of Buguma his home town by the Niger Delta Vigilante led by Ateke, a stranger, an Okrika son as an insult. On November 22, 2003, Asari taking advantage of his leadership position in the Ijaw Youth Council mobilized his forces and launched an offensive against Ateke and his men. After that bloody attack that left several persons dead, Asari and his boys liberated Buguma from the hands of the Niger Delta Vigilante while Ateke collaborators went on self-exile. These attacks and counter attacks released an atmosphere of fear and insecurity across the rural communities in the state. In some rural communities it was common to see armed gangs levying market women, mourners at funeral, oil bunkers, petroleum product distributors, commercial motorcyclist and all manner of businesses. The rural economy recorded a major setback. The usual bubbling weekend life for which the rural communities were noted for in the state occasioned by burials, marriages, chieftaincy installation, cultural festivals etc. gradually disappeared; families were no longer interested in burying their dead in the village. Even those who were courageous enough to take their dead relatives to the village for burial settled for day vigil on Saturdays. 

The usual traditional Friday vigil to honour the dead gradually eroded. Even then, they were made to pay some fees to the boys before the dead could be brought into the town or taken to the cemetery for burial. Mr. Johnson Solomon, owner of a popular beer palour in Okrika, a riverine community in the state, stated that “before the crisis, it was usual to see every beer parlour crowded with men and women on Friday night drinking and eating into the early hours of Saturday morning. Our people are noted for weekend enjoyment, it is our own way of relaxation after the busy working days in the city but all that changed when the militant war started. 

These boys have no respect for anybody; they could attack you even without provocation and empty your pocket. People became scared; they were like terror in the day and night.” Mr. Somina Golden, a former bar attendant with one of the famous hotels in Buguma, a riverine community, about thirty kilometers from the state capital, added his own story “On one fateful Friday night, some of these boys raided our hotel like bees in the pretense that an enemy was lodging in our hotel. They banged into every room searchingly, disposing lodgers of some of their personal items. At the end of the search they left with two men and some girls, the girls were raped but for the men, we never heard about them again. After that incident, hotel business collapsed completely in the town.” Observation had shown that the three famous hotels in that community; Atiri, Brooklyn and Land of Canaan hotels are still out of business. The Atere hotel today is being used to provide shelter for soldiers posted to the community by the government to secure the town. The creeks and rivers were not safe either; fishermen were often intercepted at the middle of the sea and made to part compulsorily with their biggest catch. Women who went to pick firewood or seafood in the creeks were most often raped or made to pay dues to the boys. Mr. Jonathan, a fifty-three year old carpenter from Buguma explained that his thirty-two years old wife one day joined other women to travel to Ogbakiri by sea for the traditional periodic market but never came back. None of the other women were seen either. It was assumed that they must have been murdered after being disposed of their money. There was total chaos in rural Rivers State. 

The same militant groups who were fighting the Nigerian State for selling the oil at their backyard while leaving them in poverty now turned their weapon against the same people they claimed they were fighting for. Most construction companies or agencies assigned with the responsibility of executing one projects or the other intended to improve the living standard of the people were forced to abandon their projects for either fear of risking the lives of their workers or inability to meet up with the stringent conditions put forward by these boys. Benson George, a building engineer who secured a construction job with the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), stretching over three local councils in the state explained his ordeal “Madness is one word that can be used to describe the attitude of these boys. For you to effectively execute a project in the state you will have to pay through your nose. There was this madness about “community boys” that must be settled first before you even mobilize to site. 

Then for you to land your equipment or construction materials on the site, you must pay such things as marching ground, development levy, security fee, etc. It was so frustrating because provisions were not made for such expenses in the project cost. Worst, they will also insist that certain percentage of your labour force must be given to them. The implication is that most of them are not educated and lack the expertise or discipline needed. But in all, I could not help feeling sorry for them because they are indeed hungry youths.” The multi-national oil companies operating in the areas were not left out. 

These companies determined to remain in business were compelled to make cash payment to the militant groups for access to their facilities or to ensure the security of their staff and business operations. The security agencies were helpless because of the involvement of key officers of the ruling government in the militancy crisis in the state. In the face of such gross insecurity that bedevilled the state, the geographical area was branded as an area where business could not strive, spatial development impossible and violence very lucrative.

Rural Development in the Post Amnesty Era

The current Amnesty programme initiated by the late president of Nigeria, Alhaji Musa Yar’adua started on the 25th June, 2009. The underlying objectives were (1) To stop the raging restiveness in the crisis ridden Niger Delta Region(2) Engage the ex-militants in gainful employment as well as other meaningful activities that could improve their living conditions(3) Help considerably in the social economic development of the region. At the end of the deadline given to the militants to surrender their arms and grab the carrot of Amnesty, 20,192 persons came out from various camps in the Niger Delta led by leaders like Chief Tompolo, Chief Ateke Tom, Boy Loaf, Fara Dagogo, etc. By October that same year, another additional 6,166 persons were added bringing the total to 26,358 at the end of December 2010. The acceptance of the Amnesty offer was voluntary and the government entered into a contract with those who surrendered their arms by promising a proper and non-forceful Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDR). A five year Amnesty programme was planned; 2010 – 2015. By October 2013, the programme has gulped $16 billion on the training of youths at various institutions in Ghana, South Africa, the Philippines, Russia, Ukraine and India. The prominent leaders amongst them were awarded oil pipeline protection contract worth billions of naira transforming them into billionaires overnight. 

Mr. Kingsley Kuku the presidential adviser on Niger Delta and current chairman of the programme has made his boast that the programme has been a success. How? Over 30,000 ex-militants had been trained in various vocational and technical skills. Secondly, relative peace has returned to Rivers State just like the other Niger Delta states; there is a gross reduction in human tragedy arising from militancy crises (Table3). The excuse of inability of the various contractors from various federal ministries and agencies to execute project for fear that they were going to be kidnapped or pay royalties to the militants had been grossly reduced. In addition, oil production which was as low as 680,000 barrel per day during the militancy crises had shot up tremendously. Though we may not disagree with Mr. Kuku on the positive distance the PAP has covered but in terms of cost-benefit analysis, there is no doubt the programme has incurred more cost than benefit. As rural development scholars certain questions we will not fail to ask is; how has rural development fared in this post-amnesty era? Will the masquerading problem of militancy be finally nailed to the bud by the end of the programme in 2015? 

Mr. Kuku has boastfully told us that about 30,000 ex-militants had graduated from the various vocational and technical programmes introduced by the PAP but he has failed to explain to us how the said ex-militants can be meaningfully engaged in income yielding activities that could put food on their tables and settle their bills. Mr. Kuku and the federal government are also yet to give us an explanation as to how the non-militant youths in rural Rivers State could come out from their shell of poverty and deprivation. We are yet to see any meaningful blueprint on the part of the Nigerian State or development agencies to timely address the issues for which Alhaji Asari and Ateke Tom rolled out their guns to fight the Nigerian state, the reason for which the oil pipelines were vandalized. Before the militants in the state acceded to the Amnesty offer the long issue of agitation in rural Rivers State was the development of their land, save them from environmental pollution, exercise of right to the resources in their own compound, building of roads to link the coastal areas, bring infrastructure to the place etc. 

The East-West road which gives access to the state capital from most of the rural communities in the state is still a dead-trap, recently claiming the life of the mother of the first lady of Nigeria. Despite the fact that relative peace has returned to the state, project assigned to improve the living conditions of the people through the different ministries or agencies are either moving at an epileptic speed or still on paper. During a recent inspection of the Igbiri-Abbibo-Oba road and bridge linking Port Harcourt to Okrika Local Council Area by the senate committee, Dr. Christian Oboh of the Niger Delta Development Commission has stated this, “We have seen that the contractor is not working, the next thing that they will do is to ask for variation using powerful Nigerian to mount pressure on us, meanwhile the communities are suffering.” 

This is just one of the several on-going projects in the state. Where such variations are not met, the communities are bound to see such projects abandon as had been the tradition in the Nigerian State. Health services are still far from the people. The effort of the PDP government of Amaechi to take health services to the rural areas is commendable. His beautiful edifice called “Health Centre” scattered all over the state shows the character of a man who understands the health needs of his people. But the governor’s effort is handicapped by the poor geography of the state and the absence of public infrastructure in most of the rural areas; a factor responsible for the unwillingness of World medical personnel to work in the rural areas. In the area of education, Governor Amaechi has once told the board of the Niger Delta Development Commission that paid him a courtesy visit that the era of “six classroom blocks” for primary and secondary schools for his people is over. The beautiful structures which his government has erected all over the state for primary and secondary school pupils are demonstration of his words. 

The recruitment of 13,000 teachers recently to help the educational sector had received the applause of his people. But even in the face of such applause one may still be tempted to ask how far the governor’s health and educational reform programmes can go in a state that is characterized by so much developmental deficiency in her geography and history. The governor himself acknowledged this when the board of the Niger Delta Development Commission visited him; “Rivers State has sufficient power, what we don’t have is distribution, power distribution is still a problem in Rivers State”. This is just one among several problems still living with the people. 

For Mr. Joe Numene, a 69 year old community leader from Ogoni kingdom, “The question we are asking today is how long can the government sustain the degree of peace we are presently enjoying? As I speak to you the conditions that made these young people to steal oil from the pipelines in our backyard, that made them chase us away from the communities with guns because we did not support them are still there. We were told the government had trained them but we still see them every day with hunger written all over their faces.” Mr. Jacob George, a youth leader from Soku, an oil producing community in Rivers State stated; “I use to follow my father to the sea several years back and we used to make excellent catches but there is frustration today. I go to the sea and there is nothing to catch because some strangers we allowed into our backyard to tap our God given resources had made our sea barren and when we complain that we are hungry and that they should help us, they say we are lazy people, they say we are criminals that must be crushed but they are the real criminals, stealing our oil without paying for it.”

Conclusions and Recommendations

For a study of this nature to be complete, meaningful and rewarding, it must be able to advance practicable solutions to the various problems highlighted during the course of this study. Consequent upon the research findings, the following recommendations were made:

 The three tiers of Government must as a matter of urgency fashion out an aggressive policy mechanism to address the simple and basic needs of the people of the region in areas such as health facilities, pipe-borne water, good and affordable shelter, electricity supply, road construction maintenance, education and effective skill acquisition.

 The Government should foster job creation and organize training schemes to train youths in the region in different vocations to enable them to be industrious and self-employed.

 Efforts must be made urgently to take concrete and practical steps to diversify the Nigerian economy in order to reduce its overdependence on non-renewable oil and gas resources

 Budget transparency and financial accountability at local and state levels should be strengthened by State Assemblies so that resources are properly utilized to benefit the region and implement priority projects.

 The Government should strengthen the security arrangements in the region by enforcing improved collaboration between the police and local security including private and community based security organizations.

 The Government should initiate attractive programmes of demobilization, rehabilitation and re-integration of militants

 The Niger Delta leaders and militant commanders must reciprocate government initiatives by handing over their arms to the Presidential Panel on Amnesty and Disarmament of militants.

 Hostage taking and abduction of oil workers must stop as this has taken a negative toll on the community and on innocent citizens. Rather, there should be broad based consultations and dialoguing between the people and the oil companies and the state and other stakeholders.

 there is the need to establish a mechanism to protect the oil pipelines. Part of such a strategy is the establishment of Pipeline Marshalls Commission (PMC) which would also create jobs for youths in order to protect the pipelines against further vandalisation.

 Multinational oil companies must ensure they rehabilitate and ameliorate the hazards from oil and mining exploration during and after their activities as a result of health and environmental effects in the course of their operations.

 The Oil companies must consider qualified indigenes of the communities during recruitment processes.

 Communities which have been denied their means of livelihood should be compensated for the environmental and ecological deprivations.

 The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) must make proper consultation with the respective communities in selecting projects for implementation. Also the Commission must ensure proper monitoring of all contracts awarded for proper accountability and execution of projects

REFERENCES

Adekunbi, Ero (2008). “Echoes from the Wasteland in 50 years of Oil in Nigeria”, Special Edition, Tell Magazine, February.

Ademola, M.A (2008). “Environmental Policy failure in Nigeria and the Tragedy of Underdevelopment of Niger Delta” Inaugural lecture No. 63 University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria, June 2008.

Agbo, A. (2009). “The Gains of Amnesty” TELL, November Ajaero, C. (2009). “Nigeria’s Lost Trillions”, Newswatch, May 4.

Anderson, I (2005). “Niger River basin: A Vision for Sustainable Development”, The World    Bank. Washington, D.C.

Asuni, J. (2009). “Blood Oil in the Niger Delta”, United States Institute of Peace, Special       Report 229, August.

Atojoko, Salif (2008) “Curses at Home, Blessing in Other Lands‘, in 50years of Oil in Nigeria”, Special Edition, Tell Magazine, February.

Bot, D. (2008). “Militarization of the Niger Delta: Implications for National Security”, Conference Proceedings, International Conference on the Nigerian State, Oil and the Niger Delta, Organized by the Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University, March 11-13.

Braun, R. A. and McGrattan, E. (1993). “The Macroeconomics of War and Peace”, NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 197-247.

Caplan, B. (1998): “How Does War Shock the Economy”, Unpublished manuscript, Department of Economics, George Mason University.

Clark, H. et al (1999). “Oil for Nothing: Multinational Corporations, Environmental      Destruction, Death and Impurity in the Niger Delta”. A United States “Non-Governmental Trip report.53

Dimieari, V. D. “Fuelling the Violence: Non State Armed Actors in the Niger Delta” Working paper No 10, Our Niger Delta, Port Harcourt, 2006.

Ebiri, K. “Behind the Rumbles in the Delta” The Guardian, Nigeria. Thursday, July 8,2004

Enweremadu, D. (2008). “The Vicious Circle Oil, Corruption and Armed Conflicts in the Niger Delta” Conference Proceedings, International Conference on the Nigerian State, Oil and the Niger Delta, Organized by the Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University, Wilberforce Island, March 11-13.

Eseduwo, F (2008). “Petroleum Prospecting, State Violence and Hostage Taking in Nigeria: A Study of the Niger Delta region (1966-2007)”. Conference Proceedings, International          Conference on the Nigerian State, Oil and the Niger Delta, Organized by the Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University, Wilberforce Island, March 11-13.

Gas Flaring in Nigeria: A Human Rights, Environmental and Economic Monstrosity, Climate Justice Program and Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth Nigeria, 2007.

Greenpeace International, ― Shell Shocked, Vol. 11, Greenpeace.

Gujati, D. N. (1997): Basic Econometrics, New York: McGraw Hill International Edition.

Human Rights Watch (2002): The Niger Delta: No Democratic movement, August.

Human Rights Watch (2005): “Rivers and Blood – Guns, Oil and Power in Nigeria‘s Rivers     State‘”. A Human Right Watch Briefing Paper. Washington DC: HRW.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) 1999. “The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human      Rights Violation in Nigeria’s Oil Producing Communities”, Washington DC:HRW.

Ibaba, S. (2005). “Understanding the Niger Delta Crisis”. Port Harcourt: Amethyst and Colleagues Publishers.

Ibeanu, O. “Janus Unbounded-Petro business and Petro Politics in the Niger Delta” Review of African Political Economy, no. 91 vol. 29,pp. 163-167,2002.

Ikporukpo, C. “The Niger Delta: The Geography of Terrorism and the Terror of Geography” A lecture to Mark the Retirement of Professor Michael Filani, Department of Geography University of Ibadan, Nigeria. June 27, 2007.

IRIN News (2006). “Nigeria: Militants Threaten to Cripple Oil Exports if Demands Not Met”. January 17, www.irinnews.org.

Joab-Peterside, S. “On the Militarization of the Niger Delta: The Genesis of Ethnic Militia in Rivers State, Nigeria”. (Working Paper 21) Our Niger Delta, Port Harcourt, Nigeria, 2006.

Nwilo, Peter C. and Olusegun T. Badejo (2007). Impact and Management of Oil Spill Pollution along the Nigerian Coastal Areas.

Odu, A.A. “Oil Companies and Ogbaland: How far after 20years” A lecture delivered at Ogba day celebration, Rivers State University of Science and Technolgy,Port-Harcourt, Nigeria, 1994.

Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC) Quarterly Report vol.1 no.1 and 2, 1993.

Okoko, K. and Nna J. (1997). “Federalism and Resource Allocation: The Nigerian       Experience”. Nigerian Journal of Oil and Politics, Vol. 1 No. 1 PP. 16-35.

Okonta, I and Oronto, D. (2001). “Where Vultures Feast, Forty Years of Oil in the Niger Delta”, Ibadan: Kraft Books Limited.

Onibokun, A.G “Rural Development Policy Planning and Implementation in Nigeria” Journal of the Nigerian Institute of Town Planners, vol. 7 and 9, 1987.

Online Available htpp://ezinearticles.com/?The role of oil-in-Nigerian-Economy&id=1904957.

Online Available http://unitedijaw.com/torulagha000121.htm

Online  available http://socyberty.com/issues/rural-development-in-nigeria-concept-approaches-challenges-and-prospect/

Onurah, E “Principles of Co-operative Enterprise” Express Publishers Company Limited, Enugu, Nigeria, 1986.

Owere, T.M. “Impact of Petroleum Industries in Ogba  Egbema District” A Seminar paper presented at the University of Port Harcourt,Nigeria,1990 (Unpublished).

Ukeji, C. “Youths Violence and Collapse of Public Order in the Niger Delta of Nigeria” African Development. vol. 26 no.1 and 2, 2001.

Ukiwo, U. (2007). “From Pirates to Militants: A Historical Perspective on Anti-Oil Company Mobilization among the Ijaws of Warri, Western Niger Delta”, African Affairs,         Volume 106, No. 425.